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Administrative Law's
Political Dynamics
Kent Barnett*
ChristinaL. Boyd**
ChristopherJ. Walker***
Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. commanded courts to uphold
federal agency interpretationsof ambiguous statutes as long as those
interpretations are reasonable. This Chevron deference doctrine was
based in part on the Court's desire to temper administrative law's
political dynamics by vesting federal agencies, not courts, with primary
authority to make policy judgments about ambiguous laws Congresscharged the agencies to administer. Despite this express objective,
scholars such as Frank Cross, Emerson Tiller, and Cass Sunstein have
empirically documented how politics influence circuit court review of
agency statutory interpretationsin a post-Chevron world. Among other
.things, they have reported whistleblower and panel effects, in that
ideologically diverse panels are less likely to be influenced by their
partisanpriors than ideologically uniform panels.
Leveraging the most comprehensive dataset to date on Chevron
deference in the circuit courts (more than 1,600 cases over eleven years),
this Article explores administrativelaw's political dynamics. Contrary
to prior, more limited studies, we find that legal doctrine (i.e., Chevron
deference) has a powerful constrainingeffect on partisanshipin judicial
decisionmaking. To be sure, we still find some statistically significant
results as to partisan influence. But the overall picture provides
compelling evidence that the Chevron Court's objective to reduce
partisanjudicial decisionmakinghas been quite effective. Also contrary
to prior studies, we find no statistically significant whistleblower or
panel effects. These findings have important implicationsfor the current
J. Alton Hosch Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia.
*** Associate Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University.
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debate over the future of Chevron deference. Our findings identify a
significant, overlooked cost of eliminating or narrowing Chevron
deference: such reform could result in partisanshipplaying a larger role
in judicial review of agency statutory interpretations.
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INTRODUCTION

For decades, legal scholars and political scientists have largely
talked past each other when it comes to the effect of legal doctrine on
judicial decisionmaking. Legal scholars, judges, and practitioners, for
their part, often routinely argue, or at least assume, that lower court
judges dutifully apply the legal doctrine shaped by higher courts as well
as other binding judicial precedent.' Political scientists, by contrast, are
generally doctrinal skeptics-arguing in theory and demonstrating
empirically how political dynamics shape judicial decisionmaking in
appellate courts. In other words, legal scholars primarily assume a
"legal model" of judicial decisionmaking, while political scientists
primarily posit an "attitudinal model."
This debate between the legal and attitudinal models matters as
to any legal doctrine. But it has pronounced importance in the context
of administrative law and, in particular, judicial review of agency
statutory interpretations, because the Supreme Court has expressly
highlighted its concern over removing politics from judicial
decisionmaking in this context. Over three decades ago in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court
announced that a reviewing court must defer to a federal agency's
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that the agency
administers. 2 Once the reviewing court concludes that the statute is
ambiguous, "[tihe court need not conclude that the agency construction
was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold theconstruction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." 3 The agency's
interpretation must merely be "reasonable" to survive judicial scrutiny.
Chevron, accordingly, recognizes agencies' interpretive primacy over
courts when construing ambiguous statutes.
Critically for our purposes, the Chevron Court grounded this
deference doctrine in part on the need to reserve political (or policy)
judgments for the politically accountable executive branch agencies:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not
on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which

1.

See generally BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAw OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT (2016) (treatise

coauthored by Garner and twelve prominent appellate judges). Legal realists and critical theorists
are the most prominent exceptions. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal
Realism: A Case of Unfortunate InterdisciplinaryIgnorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 267 (1997)
("Legal realists and critical legal scholars have long maintained that opinions are post-facto
rationalizations of results dictated by judicial ideology.").
2.
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
3.
Id. at 843 n.11.
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Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged
4
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.

Put differently, a chief and express objective of Chevron deference is to
remove politics from judicial decisionmaking-to create a "space," as
Peter Strauss and Justice Scalia have framed it, for federal agencies to
implement their policy prerogatives or the President's political
preferences. 5 This political-accountability objective has become more
significant as the Supreme Court has recently praised Chevron's
promotion of interpretive uniformity. 6 By giving agencies policymaking
space and reducing judicial interpretive space, Chevron deference
should lead federal courts across the country to accept agency statutory
interpretations more often and thus reach uniform results (regardless
of panel composition).7
Two decades ago in the pages of the Yale Law Journal, Frank
Cross and Emerson Tiller attempted to "fuse the various judicial
decisionmaking models of political scientists and legal scholars to
explain and demonstrate empirically under what conditions appellate
court judges do obey the legal doctrines the Supreme Court has set
out." 8 Analyzing some 170 judicial decisions by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that involved Chevron deference, Cross and
Tiller's landmark finding was that, while politics affect judicial
decisionmaking, "panel effects"-i.e., the effects of participating in
ideologically diverse three-judge panels-temper the influence of
judicial partisanship. 9 Cass Sunstein, among others, has further
explored "panel effects" in this administrative law context and reached
similar conclusions.1 0 Cross and Tiller (and Sunstein and others) have

Id. at 865-66.
4.
5.
Peter L. Strauss, "Deference"Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and
"Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144-45 (2012); accord United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that ambiguities in statutes subject to
Chevron deference "create a space, so to speak, for the exercise of continuing agency discretion").
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013).
6.
See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
7.
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 208 (2006) ("If Chevron were not the law and were not followed

faithfully, regulatory law-involving, for example, the environment, communications, and labormanagement relations-would inevitably be highly variable across the country.").
Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanshipand Obedience to Legal
8.
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2158 (1998).
See id. at 2175-76.
9.
10. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative
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thus wisely focused on Chevron deference to explore the political
dynamics of judicial decisionmaking. Of all legal doctrine, one would
expect Chevron to be among the most powerful in constraining judicial
partisanship, as that is one of the doctrine's express purposes.
Although prior studies explored these political dynamics to some
degree with relatively small or otherwise limited datasets, to date there
has been no comprehensive empirical investigation. This Article seeks
to remedy that. To do so, we leverage a dataset that two of us
constructed-the most comprehensive of its kind-that includes every
published circuit court decision that involved Chevron or Skidmore
deference" from 2003 through 2013.12 Over this eleven-year period, the
federal courts of appeals reviewed 1,613 agency statutory
interpretations in 1,382 published opinions where they considered
applying either Chevron or Skidmore deference (meaning that one
decision may concern review of more than one agency statutory
interpretation). In prior work, two of us presented a descriptive account
of our findings without concern for judges' political ideologies. 13 We
reported that, contrary to growing consensus, agencies prevailed
substantially more often under Chevron review than less deferential'
standards. We also discussed how the circuits differed in applying
Chevron and other standards of review, how the kind of agency action
affected agency-win rates, how different agencies fared in the circuits,
and which doctrinal and theoretical factors had express salience in
judicial review. 14 All three of us (including one who is a lawyer, political'
scientist, and expert in empirical analysis of judicial behavior) then
explored in a statistically more sophisticated manner the narrower
question of whether politics affects circuit courts' decisions to apply the
Chevron framework (as opposed to the less-deferential Skidmore
doctrine or de novo review). 15
Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade
& Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004). See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory
Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel

A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010) (providing literature review).
11. Skidmore deference refers to the Court's judicial review in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944). Under Skidmore review, the courts retain interpretive primacy, but they defer to
an agency's interpretation based on several factors, including the thoroughness of the agency's
interpretation and its consistency with the agency's prior pronouncements. See id. at 140.
12. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (2017).
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, The Politics of Selecting
Chevron Deference, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 597 (2018). In two shorter essays, two of us
explored more qualitatively the findings from our dataset on how circuit courts approach the major
questions doctrine, see Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Short-Circuiting the New Major
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Relying on the same dataset, this capstone Article empirically
explores administrative law's political dynamics and our findings'
meaning for Chevron's theoretical grounding. Like earlier, more limited
studies, we find that politics play some role in how circuit courts review
agency statutory interpretations. For instance, conservative panels are
more likely to agree with conservative agency interpretations and less
likely to agree with liberal interpretations; vice versa for liberal
panels.16
But our findings become very surprising once we separate how
conservative and liberal panels act in cases in which they apply and do
not apply Chevron deference. We find that Chevron deference
significantly curbs (but does not fully constrain) judicial discretion. For
instance, the most liberal panels agree with conservative agency
statutory interpretations only 18% of the time when they do not use
Chevron deference but 51% when they do. Similarly, the most
conservative panels agree with liberal agency interpretations only 18%
of the time without Chevron deference but 66% with it.17 Nonetheless,
political behavior still likely exists, even with Chevron deference's
mollifying effects. We found that conservative panels are up to 23%
more likely than liberal panels to agree with conservative agency
interpretations under Chevron deference and up to 36% more likely
than liberal panels to agree with conservative agency interpretations
under a lesser form of deference. Likewise, we found a 25% difference
across the ideological spectrum for review of liberal agency
interpretations under Chevron (with liberal panels being more likely
than conservative ones to agree) and a whopping 63% difference
without Chevron deference. 18 Based on our findings, Chevron deference
predominantly supports the legal model by powerfully, even if not fully,
constraining ideology in judicial decisionmaking.
When applying Chevron, panels of all ideological stripes use the
framework similarly and reveal modest ideological behavior. For
instance, both liberal and conservative panels are more likely to find
the statute unambiguous when the agency's interpretation is contrary
to the panel's ideological preferences. Likewise, both liberal and
conservative panels are more likely to find the statute ambiguous when
Questions Doctrine, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 147 (2017) [hereinafter Barnett & Walker, ShortCircuiting Major Questions], and on how circuit courts review agency interpretations under
Chevron's second step (the "reasonableness" inquiry), see Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker,
Chevron Step Two's Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441 (2018) [hereinafter Barnett & Walker,
Chevron Step Two's Domain]. These essays, like Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 12,
neither consider ideology nor rely upon sophisticated statistical analyses.
16. See infra Section IV.A.
17. See infra Section W.A.
18. See infra Section IV.A.
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the agency's interpretation aligns with the panels' ideological
preferences. This means that panels permit agencies more
policymaking space when the administrative interpretations are
consistent with the panels' views. More specifically, we found that
conservative panels were as much as 21% more likely than liberal
panels to find no ambiguity when reviewing a liberal agency
interpretation, while liberal panels were as much as 14% more likely
than conservative panels to find no ambiguity when reviewing
conservative agency interpretations. Nonetheless, contrary to Justice
Scalia's view that textualist judges (who generally identify as
conservative1 9 ) may be more likely to find statutes unambiguous
regardless of the valence of the agency interpretation, 2 0 we found no
relationship between panel ideology and a panel holding a statute
unambiguous. 2 1
We also briefly considered individual judges' behaviors in
reviewing agency statutory interpretations. We find that of the 30
liberal judges examined, the majority behaved in expected ideological
(liberal) ways. Only rarely did individual liberal judges indicate, on
average, conservative behavior. In contrast, the 30 conservative judges
examined demonstrated less political behavior overall than liberal
judges. A nontrivial number of conservative judges, including some
prominent ones, more favorably reviewed liberal interpretations than
conservative interpretations. 22
Finally, contrary to studies by Cross and Tiller and Sunstein and
others, we find no "whistleblower effects" in how circuit courts apply
Chevron deference. In other words, whether a panel is ideologically
uniform or diverse does not affect whether circuit courts apply the
Chevron framework, nor does it affect agency-win rates on judicial
review. Indeed, we saw only minor differences at either ideological
extreme (where we would have most anticipated whistleblowing effects
to occur), and those differences were in the opposite direction than

19. See Paul Killebrew, Note, Where Are All the Left-Wing Textualists?, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1895, 1898 (2007) (citing James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5, 6 (2005)) (noting that "empirical
evidence also suggests that, aside from the fact that textualist judges are generally conservative,
the use of textualist methods is disproportionately associated with conservative outcomes in
certain cases").
20. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 521.
21. See infra Part VI; cf. Raymond M. Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections
After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 323 (2017) (observing that
in nearly ten years on the Sixth Circuit, he has yet to find a statute ambiguous at Chevron step
one, even though "there have been plenty of cases where the agency wanted us to").
22. See infra Part V.
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expected. 23 On its face, this finding is startling as it cuts against the
grain of longstanding empirical conclusions based on smaller datasets.
Upon further reflection, however, it should not be too surprising in light
of our main finding. Because Chevron deference is such a powerful, if
imperfect, constraint on the influence of partisanship in judicial
decisionmaking, the ideological composition of the panel may have
little, if any, additional constraining role to play.
These constraining effects have important implications for the
current doctrinal, policy, and theoretical debates concerning the future
of Chevron deference. In recent years, more members of the federal
bench, the legal academy, and the Hill have called for the eliminationor at least narrowing-of Chevron deference. 24 The findings from this
Article suggest that one significant and overlooked cost of eliminating
or narrowing Chevron deference is that it could result in partisanship
playing a larger role in judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations. Moreover, with more partisanship, one would expect
less interpretive uniformity across jurisdictions and ideologically
diverse panels. It may turn out that, even with this cost taken into
account, one would conclude that such reform efforts produce a net
benefit. That inquiry far exceeds the ambitions of this Article. To date,
however, this cost of increased partisan judicial decisionmaking and
risk of interpretive disparity has been largely absent from these
debates.
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we briefly set forth
the doctrine of Chevron deference as it has developed over the last three
decades and explore its theoretical underpinnings. Part II surveys prior
empirical studies concerning the role of politics in judicial
decisionmaking. Part III provides an overview of our empirical study; a
description of our study design, methodology, and dataset; and a ten
thousand-foot view of Chevron in the circuit courts.
The remaining Parts present the findings from our study and
discuss their implications for administrative law. Part IV examines the
politics of invoking Chevron deference, including the effects of panel
ideology on agency-win rates and on whether the panel applies the
Chevron deference framework as well as other factors which seem to
affect judicial decisionmaking. Part V shifts focus from panels to
individual judges to explore the degree of variation in Chevron
deference exhibited by liberal and conservative circuit judges. Part VI
examines the subset of cases where the circuit courts apply the Chevron

23. See infra Part VII.
24. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature
Review, 15 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2018).
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deference framework to explore any ideological effects at Chevron steps
one and two. And Part VII returns to the central findings of prior
studies-whistleblower and panel effects-and explores how such
effects are not present in our data.
The Article concludes by discussing the implications of our
findings for (1) the scholarly debate between those who support the
legal model and the attitudinal model, (2) Chevron deference's
theoretical bases, and (3) current calls to revisit the Chevron deference
doctrine's mechanics, domain, or very existence.
I. CHEVRON'S FOUNDATION

A. The Doctrine of Chevron Deference
In Chevron, the Court upheld the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") regulations under the Clean Air Act. The Act required
states that had not met national air-quality standards to establish
permitting programs to regulate "new or modified major stationary
sources" of air pollution. 25 The EPA's regulations allowed states to,
adopt a plant-wide definition of "stationary source." 26 Accordingly, an
existing plant that contained several pollution-emitting devices could
install or modify one device without needing a permit as long as the
alteration would not increase the plant's total emissions. 27 The
challengers argued that the plant-wide "bubble" concept was contrary
to the statute because "stationary source" included either a plant or any
of its components that emitted more than a certain threshold of
pollutant. 28

The Court followed a two-step approach in upholding the EPA's
construction of a statute that it administered. 29 Using "traditional tools
of statutory construction," 3 0 the first step inquired whether Congress
had directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If so, both the Court
and agency were bound. But if Congress had not done so, the Court
could not simply impose what it viewed as the best construction.
Instead, it had to defer to the agency's interpretation at step two as long
as it was "permissible." 3 1

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
Id.
See id.
See id. at 859.
See id. at 842-43.
Id. at 843 n.9.
Id. at 843.
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Following these steps, the Court held at step one that Congress
had not clearly stated its intent as to the meaning of "stationary source"
in the text, drafting history, or legislative history. 32 Moving to step two,
the Court deemed the EPA's "bubble" concept "a reasonable
accommodation of manifestly competing interests."3 3 The EPA was
entitled to deference based on the "technical and complex" regulatory
scheme and the agency's "detailed and reasoned" consideration. 3 4 The
Court emphasized that federal judges must respect the policymaking
space within statutory ambiguities or silence which Congress has
delegated-whether expressly or silently-to experts.35
relatively
seems
framework
two-step
Chevron
The
straightforward and capable of limiting judicial policy preferences when
reviewing agency statutory interpretation. Yet scholars and courts have
criticized the ever-more complicated framework. Those criticisms
center around (1) both steps one and two, 3 6 (2) when Chevron applies
(whether to certain questions 37 and certain methods of agency
interpretation 38), and (3) whether the framework affects judicial
decisionmaking. 39 Indeed, based on its perceived failures, one
prominent scholar has called for an end to Chevron deference. 40
Likewise, two sitting Justices have expressed hostility toward Chevron,
largely based on its perceived unfairness to regulated parties and
Article III separation of powers mandates. 41 Conservative circuit judges
32. See id. at 845-64.
33. Id. at 865.
34. See id. at 865.
35. See id. at 865-66.
36. See, e.g., Barnett & Walker, Chevron Step Two's Domain, supra note 15, at 1446-57
(discussing the Court's treatment of step two and scholarly discussions); Linda Jellum, Chevron's
Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2007) (arguing
that the Supreme Court has moved, with some inconsistency from various Justices, from an
intentionalist to a textualist inquiry at step one); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 83, 85 n.9 (1994) (listing scholarship that considers the appropriate tools of statutory
interpretation at step one).
37. See Barnett & Walker, Short-Circuiting Major Questions, supra note 15, at 151-54
(describing extension of "major questions doctrine" and scholarly reaction).
38. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1449-50 (2005) (discussing views).
39. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions
Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 83-84 (2011) (reviewing studies of Chevron and finding that choice
of doctrine has little effect on judicial decisionmaking).
40. Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed
and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 850 (2010).
41. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Cynthia Farina argued shortly after the Chevron decision that Chevron deference violated the
separation of powers. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989).
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have recently expressed similar skepticism. 42 Because others (including
two of us) have covered these matters in significant detail elsewhere,
we only summarize the ongoing disputes most relevant for discussing
our findings and their implications.
1. Steps One and Two
The Court has been far from clear as to how the two Chevron
steps should operate. Chevron itself called for "traditional tools of
statutory construction" at step one 43 and relied upon statutory text,
historical development of the Clean Air Act, and legislative history of
relevant amendments as tools. 4 4 Yet over the decades, the Court has
likely turned the first step into a purely textual inquiry, meaning that
step one has become a textualist, as opposed to an intentionalist,
inquiry. 45 As for step two, the Chevron Court provided little guidance
as to its application, but did evaluate the agency's reasoning, its
accommodation of competing interests, and its overall substantive
reasonableness as part of that inquiry. In later cases, the Court has
waffled between a textual or structural approach on the one hand, and
the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary and capricious review
standard on the other. 46 Indeed, our data of circuit court decisions
rejecting an agency statutory interpretation at step two indicate that
the circuit courts do not approach step two consistently. We found that
no single approach to step two-whether best described as arbitrary
and capricious review, purposivism, or textualist-predominated,

42. See Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., concurring)
("An Article III renaissance is emerging against the judicial abdication performed in Chevron's
name."); Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 278 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring in
the judgment) (criticizing Chevron):
The doctrine of deference deserves another look. Chevron . . . and [its] like are, with all
respect, contrary to the roles assigned to the separate branches of government; they
embed perverse incentives in the operations of government; they spread the spores of
the ever-expanding administrative state; they require us at times to lay aside fairness
and our own best judgment and instead bow to the nation's most powerful litigant, the
government, for no reason other than that it is the government.;
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2150-54 (2016)
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (drawing on his experience as a D.C.
Circuit judge to express concerns with Chevron deference).
43. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
44. Barnett & Walker, Chevron Step Two's Domain, supra note 15, at 1447.
45. See, e.g., Jellum, supranote 36, at 729 (arguing that the Supreme Court has moved, with
some inconsistency from various Justices, from an intentionalist to a textualist inquiry at step
one).
46. Barnett & Walker, Chevron Step Two's Domain, supra note 15, at 1448-57 (discussing
the Court's varying descriptions and approaches to step two).

1474

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:5:1463

suggesting that the courts of appeals do not agree on how step two
should operate. 47
2. When Chevron Applies
Uncertainty exists not only as to how, but also when Chevron
applies. The Chevron Court indicated that the two-step framework
applied to all interpretations concerning a statute that an agency
administers. But the Court has indicated that not all interpretive issues
are suitable for deference. Most notably, the Court has recently
confirmed that Chevron's framework does not apply to questions
concerning "deep 'economic and political significance' that [are] central
to [the] statutory scheme" at issue.4 8 Such questions, although rare,
concern, for example, the IRS's interpretation of "an Exchange
established by the State"49 and the Attorney General's statutory
interpretation implicating "medical judgments" outside of his
expertise.5 0 Otherwise, the Court has given little guidance.5 1
Relatedly, the uncertainty as to when Chevron applies extends
to the method by which the agency must provide its interpretation. The
Chevron Court indicated that the two-step framework applied to all
agency statutory interpretations. But after Chevron, the Court clarified
in two leading decisions-United States v. Mead Corp.52 and
Christensen v. Harris County53-that Chevron applies only to agency
statutory interpretations with the "force of law." 5 4 Those
interpretations are usually the product of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or on-the-record "formal" adjudication. But less formal
interpretations may also occasionally qualify,5 5 such as interpretive

47. See id. at 1466 fig.5.
48. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
49. Id. at 2488-89.
50. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266 (2006).
51. Barnett & Walker, Short-CircuitingMajor Questions, supra note 15, at 153 (citing David
Gamage, Foreword-Kingv. Burwell Symposium: Comments on the Commentaries (and on Some
Elephants in the Room), 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015); and Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps)
Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 57 (2015)).
52. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
53. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
54. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227; see id. at 229 ("We have recognized a very good indicator of
delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the
process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is
claimed.").
55. See id. at 230 ("[Tlhe want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have
sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was
required and none was afforded.").
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ruleS 5 6 or policy statements.5 7 This indeterminacy over which agency

actions have the force of law has led to the "Mead Puzzle," as'lower
courts attempt to determine which agency actions suffice.5 8
3. Impact on Judicial Decisionmaking
Regardless of Chevron deference's perceived elasticity, some
have questioned its effectiveness. For instance, Richard Pierce
evaluated affirmance rates in the Supreme Court and circuit courts
from earlier empirical studies. He found that the affirmance ranges for
de novo, Skidmore, and Chevron review overlap: 66% for de novo review,
55.1% to 70.9% for Skidmore, and 64% to 81.3% for Chevron.59 Pierce
argued that "a court's choice of which doctrine to apply in reviewing an
agency action is not an important determinant of outcomes in the
Supreme Court or the circuit courts." 60
The uncertainty surrounding Chevron's steps and its reach
create room for judges to leverage Chevron (or not) to further their
policy preferences. 6 1 Although some indeterminacy is inherent in any
review standard, the breadth of that indeterminacy is more salient
when the purpose of the doctrine, like Chevron, is to separate judges
from political decisions. Our results provide some guidance on how well
Chevron limits the influence of judges' policy preferences.
B. The Theory of Chevron Deference
Although administrative law scholars disagree about Chevron's
theoretical foundations, 62 the Supreme Court has regularly grounded
56. See, e.g., Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying
Chevron deference to interpretive rules).
57. See, e.g., Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 383 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 2004)
(concluding that "Chevron deference is due to HUD's, [statutory] interpretation" in a policy
statement).
58. See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 56-58 (2015).
59. See Pierce, supra note 39, at 83-84.
60. See id. at 85; see also Beermann, supra note 40, at 830 (concluding after reviewing
empirical studies concerning Supreme Court and circuit court decisionmaking that "[t]here is thus
no reason to believe that Chevron has been more successful in the lower courts than at the Supreme
Court"); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent Stare
Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1598 (2016) (noting that agency-win rates in the Supreme Court
"undercut the value of Chevron").
61. Cf. Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 669 (2004) ("Standing
decisions may be motivated by politics, but only when neither clear doctrine exists nor judicial
monitoring takes place.").
62. See generally Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1283-91 (2008)
(surveying literature). One serious criticism of the congressional delegation theory is that the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") itself does not expressly embrace a doctrine of deference to
agency statutory interpretations but instead commands reviewing courts to "decide all relevant
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Chevron deference in a theory of congressional delegation. 63 Under this
delegation theory, courts must defer to an agency's interpretation
because there is "a 'presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity
in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that
the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree
of discretion the ambiguity allows.' "64 Such congressional delegation
need not be express as to the specific ambiguity. Delegation is usually
implied (or at least presumed) whenever (1) a statute gives the agency
the authority to act with the force of law by enacting notice-andcomment rules or by conducting formal on-the-record adjudication and
(2) the agency has used those procedures.6 5
As two of us have noted elsewhere, "[t]he key criticism of the
delegation theory is that it is fictional or fraudulent"-fictional because
ambiguity does not necessarily evince congressional intent, and
fraudulent because the Supreme Court seems disinterested in actually
assessing congressional intent. 66 Moreover, the Court has failed to
provide a robust normative basis for the congressional delegation
theory, though it has suggested that the delegation theory resides in
political
process,
deliberative
expertise,
of agency
notions
accountability, and national uniformity or stability.6 7 Each normative
basis merits additional discussion.
1. Agency Expertise
Agency expertise is considered one of the bedrock rationales for
Chevron deference. 68 Indeed, the Chevron Court itself emphasized
questions of law." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of JudicialDeference to
Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908, 985-95 (2016) (arguing that Chevron deference is not
consistent with the APA).
63. Barnett, supra note 58, at 14-15.
64. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)
(quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001). But see Christopher J.
Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron Deference, 81 Mo. L. REV. 1095, 1105 (2016) (exploring
how Chief Justice Roberts may be embracing a narrower, more context-specific Chevron deference
that "would focus not just on the formality of the agency procedure creating the interpretation, but
also whether Congress intended to delegate that particular substantive question to the agency").
66. Barnett & Walker, Short-CircuitingMajor Questions, supra note 15, at 155.
67. Barnett, supra note 58, at 14-15. Scholars, moreover, have advanced additional
normative bases for deference, including agency flexibility. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 62, at
1291 (noting various additional bases).
68. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 62, at 1286-88; accord Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why
Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 737 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and AdministrationAfter Chevron, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 2071, 2086 (1990).
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noting that Congress

perhaps "consciously desired the [agency] to strike the balance at this
level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better
position to do so."69 Congress delegates interpretive authority to
agencies, instead of generalist courts, at least in part because those
agencies are more expert than courts in the subject matter.
This expertise rationale extends beyond the agency's
comparative policy or technical expertise in the subject matter; it also
encompasses the agency's comparative expertise in the structure and
purpose of the statute itself. As Justice Scalia noted decades ago, "The
cases, old and new, that accept administrative interpretations, often
refer to the 'expertise' of the agencies in question, their intense
familiarity with the history and purposes of the legislation at issue,
their practical knowledge of what will best effectuate those purposes."7 0
Justice Breyer has expanded on this "better understanding of
congressional will" rationale for judicial deference:
The agency that enforces the statute may have had a hand in drafting its provisions. It
may possess an internal history in the form of documents or "handed-down oral tradition"
that casts light on the meaning of a difficult phrase or provision. Regardless, its staff, in
close contact with relevant legislators and staffs, likely understands currentcongressional
views, which, in turn, may, through institutional history, reflect prior understandings. At
a minimum, the agency staff understands the sorts of interpretations needed to "make
71
the statute work."

As one of us has empirically documented elsewhere, agencies play a
substantial role in the legislative process, such that they possess far
greater expertise than courts as to the legislative processes that
resulted in the statutory schema that the agencies administer. 72
Because of expertise's doctrinal prominence as a basis for
Chevron doctrine, scholars have explored it in some depth empirically
in the literature. Most prominently, Lisa Bressman and Abbe Gluck
have surveyed congressional drafters regarding their approaches to
statutory drafting.7 3 Of all the interpretive tools included in their
69. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,865 (1984).
70. Scalia, supra note 20, at 514.
71. Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
368 (1986).
72. See Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 1406-07
(2017); accord Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 129
(2015) (arguing that, "at least in some situations, courts should grant greater deference to
agencies" based on their involvement in the legislative process). See generally CHRISTOPHER J.
WALKER, FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN STATUTORY

DRAFTING (Admin. Conference of the U.S. ed., 2015).
73. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretationfrom the InsideAn Empirical Study of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
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survey, Chevron deference was the most known (82%) by congressional
drafters. 74 When asked about which types of statutory gaps or
ambiguities Congress intends for federal agencies to fill, moreover, the
congressional respondents emphasized the importance of agency
expertise: 93% of respondents said the agency's area of expertise
mattered. The related expertise-driven rationales of ambiguities
concerning implementation details (99%) and omissions in statutes
(72%) also garnered large responses. 7 5
Agency rule drafters seem to have similar impressions about the
centrality of agency expertise to Chevron deference. One of us surveyed
agency officials regarding how they approach statutory interpretation
and rulemaking, replicating many of the questions from the Bressman
and Gluck study. 76 Like the congressional respondents, the agency rule
drafters surveyed did not view all statutory ambiguities equally.
Instead, statutory gaps or ambiguities relating to agency expertise were
those Congress most likely intended to delegate to federal agencies to
fill: implementation details (99%) and agency's area of expertise
1
(92%).77
2. Deliberative Process
Although the Chevron decision itself did not focus on the value
of the deliberative process involved in the agency crafting its statutory
interpretation, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have focused on
the importance of an agency's deliberative process for evidence of
congressional delegation.7 8 The most important case on this subject, as
discussed in Section I.A, is United States v. Mead Corp.79 The Mead

REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part1]; Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Bressman & Gluck,
Part II].
74. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 73, at 994-95.
75. Id. at 1005 fig.11. As Bressman and Gluck concluded, the congressional respondents
viewed federal agencies-not courts-as their primary partners in implementing and interpreting
statutes; they "saw agencies as the everyday statutory interpreters, viewed interpretive rules as
tools for agencies, too, and made no distinction, as some scholars have, between agency statutory
'implementation' and agency statutory 'interpretation.'" Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note
73, at 765.
76. See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation,67 STAN. L. REV. 999
(2015).
77. Id. at 1053 fig.10.
78. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 62, at 1308-10 (discussing the Court's reliance on the
agency's deliberative process (or lack thereof) in deciding whether Chevron deference was
appropriate in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007); and Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)).
79. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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Mead was a "big winner" in our study-the canon whose underlying assumption was most
validated by our [congressional] respondents after Chevron: 88% told us that the
authorization of notice-and-comment rulemaking (the signal identified by the Court in
Mead) is always or often relevant to whether drafters intend for an agency to have gap83
filling authority.

%

Court held that not all agency interpretations of statutory ambiguities
merited Chevron deference, but "a very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment [is] express congressional authorizations
to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed."8 0 Or, as Mead's
loudest critic--Justice Scalia 81-put it over a decade later: "[T]he
preconditions to deference under Chevron are satisfied because
Congress has unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to
administer the Communications Act through rulemaking and
adjudication, and the agency interpretation at issue was promulgated
in the exercise of that authority." 82
Like agency expertise, agency deliberative process as a
normative basis for delegation finds support in the realities of statutory
drafting. Bressman and Gluck indicated that when congressional
drafters were asked about the Mead doctrines by concept,

The results were similar among the agency rule drafters
surveyed. The rule drafters were asked whether eight different factors
"affect whether Chevron deference (as opposed to Skidmore deference
or no deference) applies to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous
statute it administers." 84 The leading factors the agency rule drafters
reported to affect whether Chevron deference applies are the two Mead
principles: whether Congress authorized the agency to engage in
rulemaking and/or formal adjudication under the statute (84%), and
whether the agency promulgated the interpretation via rulemaking
and/or formal adjudication (80%).85
3. Political Accountability
Another key rationale the Court has proffered for its delegation
theory of Chevron deference concerns political accountability. As the
Chevron Court itself noted, "Judges are not experts in the field, and are

80.
81.
judicial
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 229.
Cf. id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('"Today's opinion makes an avulsive change in
review of federal administrative action.").
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013).
Gluck & Bressman, PartI, supra note 73, at 999.
Walker, supra note 76, at 1063.
Id. at 1063-64, 1065 tbl.1.
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not part of either political branch of the Government." 86 Agencies, by
contrast, are part of a political branch (the executive) and report back
to another political branch (the legislature). "While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people," the Chevron Court explained:
[T]he Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by
87
the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.

The political-accountability basis for Chevron deference has not
been as well received in the administrative law literature 88-with thenProfessor Kagan's Presidential Administration being a very notable
exception. 89 The main criticism is that this rationale depends on a
unitary executive model of presidential control that-whatever its
theoretical benefits or normative force-does not and likely cannot exist
in reality.9 0 Moreover, the effect of any agency action is likely negligible
on voter behavior.9 1 Nor does the political-accountability rationale seem
to find much support from congressional and agency drafters. In the
agency rule drafter study, only 9% of the respondents indicated that an
agency's political accountability was a factor that affects whether
Chevron deference applies to the agency's interpretation of an
ambiguous statute that the agency administers. 92 The Bressman and
Gluck congressional survey did not explore political accountability as a
basis for Chevron deference. 93
Scholars and agencies, on the one hand, and the Court, on the
other, may be talking past one another. Rather than asking about the
extent of agencies' political accountability in the abstract, as scholars
have largely done, the Chevron Court considered the concept from a
comparative-institutional perspective. The Court considered political
accountability comparatively between the courts and executive
agencies. The Chevron Court's focus on political accountability arguably
was to minimize the influence of partisanship in judicial

86. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
87. Id. at 865-66.
88. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 62, at 1288-90 (reviewing literature).
89. See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2376 (2001)
("Chevron's primary rationale suggests [an] approach, which would link deference in some way to
presidential involvement."). But see Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law, and
PresidentialInfluence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679, 680 (2014) (arguing
against the proposition that "presidential involvement in an agency's decision making should
intensify its entitlement to Chevron deference").
90. See Criddle, supra note 62, at 1289.
91. See id. at 1290.
92. Walker, supra note 76, at 1065 tbl.1.
93. Gluck & Bressman, PartI, supra note 73, at 992.
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decisionmaking, especially where a federal agency has already
exercised its policy judgment. As the Chevron Court noted, "Courts
must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on
the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences."94 A federal agency,
on the other hand, "may, within the limits of that [congressional]
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments."9 5
4. National Uniformity
The final, more recent rationale proffered for Chevron deference
is that it promotes interpretive uniformity. It does so by limiting courts'
responsibility for determining the best reading of a statute. Instead, as
Peter Strauss has argued, courts need only assess the reasonableness
of an agency's interpretation, rendering it more likely that lower federal
courts across the country will agree in accepting or rejecting the
agency's interpretation. 9 6 Moreover, by providing agencies space for
interpreting statutory ambiguities, Chevron provides a disincentive for.
judicial challenges and thereby allows the agency to provide a national
standard even absent judicial review.
The Court recently echoed Strauss's argument. In holding that
Chevron applied to questions surrounding an agency's "jurisdiction"
under a statutory scheme, the Court in City of Arlington v. FCC
recognized the "stabilizing purpose of Chevron."97 The Court observed
that, unlike "[t]hirteen Courts of Appeals applying a totality-of-thecircumstances test," Chevron deference provides predictability to
agency statutory interpretations. 98
Unlike the other theoretical grounds for Chevron, uniformity has
received relatively light scholarly treatment, perhaps because the Court
invoked it only a few years ago. But in the descriptive account of the
data that serves as the basis for the results discussed in this Article,
two of us noted that our data provides conflicting evidence regarding
the effectiveness of Chevron's success in achieving uniformity.9 9 We
reported that agencies prevailed 39% more often under Chevron than
de novo review, indicating that Chevron does lead to agencies receiving

94. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
95. Id.
96. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for JudicialReview of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121-22
(1987); accordVERMEULE, supra note 7, at 208.
97. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013).
98. Id.
99. Barnett & Walker, supra note 12, at 71.
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more interpretive space,1 00 which encourages uniformity. But when one
considers the results circuit by circuit, Chevron's success at promoting
uniformity is questionable. For instance, the range of agency-win rates
across the circuits with and without Chevron deference is striking. At
one extreme, the Sixth Circuit agreed with agency interpretations
88.2% of the time when it applied Chevron's framework but only 39.4%
without Chevron. At the other extreme, the Eighth Circuit agreed with
the agency 76.2% of the time under Chevron's framework and nearly as
much without Chevron (71.4%).101
Our descriptive account purposefully avoided discussing how
judicial political preferences affect judicial behavior or our results. This
variable is highly relevant to assess Chevron's success in promoting
interpretive uniformity more fully. Agencies can obtain meaningful
interpretive space under Chevron only if judges of different ideological
stripes across the country are consistent in deferring to agency
statutory interpretations. If ideological preferences affect judicial
review notwithstanding Chevron, one would expect different results
based on panel composition in challenges across the country, which
would impede an agency's ability to provide a uniform, national answer
to the statute in question. Relatedly, it would encourage forum
shopping and numerous judicial challenges.

The focus of this Article is not to further explore the well-trod
agency expertise and deliberative-process rationales for Chevron's
delegation theory, though our findings do shed some additional light on
those rationales. Instead, using the most comprehensive database of its
kind, the Article aims to assess the bases of political accountability and
uniformity by assessing Chevron's effectiveness in constraining
partisanship in judicial decisionmaking. These areas are ripe for
further empirical, normative, and theoretical development.
II. PRIOR CHEVRON EMPIRICAL STUDIES
By expressly grounding Chevron deference in notions of
agencies' political accountability and expertise, Chevron seeks to
divorce judges' individual policy preferences from decisional outcomes.
But should one expect Chevron to succeed in its objective? The answer
depends upon which one of two key theories of judicial behavior

100. Id.
101. Id. at 48 fig.9.
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prevails. Under the legal model, Chevron should succeed because judges
will apply neutral deference and statutory-interpretation principlesall of which are external to the judges' policy preferences-to reach
uniform results. 10 2 Contrary to the legal model and in support of the
attitudinal model, 103 numerous empirical studies have found that
circuit judges' policy preferences significantly predict judicial behavior
in various contexts,1 04 even if external factors limit judges from
achieving preferred policy outcomes in some cases. 0 5 Prior empirical
findings on Chevron deference in the courts of appeals specifically
support the attitudinal model and suggest that Chevron has largely
failed in separating judicial policy preferences from case outcomes.
Perhaps the best known of these studies is Frank Cross and
Emerson Tiller's twenty-year-old study of approximately 170 D.C.
Circuit cases decided between 1991 and 1995 that cited Chevron.106 The
authors found strong evidence of policy convergence between judicial
policy preferences and case outcomes. More specifically, they concluded
that a "panel is 31% more likely to defer (that is, follow [Chevron]) when
its policy preferences are consistent with the agency's policies than
when they are not."10 7
Later empirical work that also considered Chevron outcomes
supports the attitudinal model. Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein
considered more than 200 published Chevron decisions decided between
1990 and 2004 from the courts of appeals that reviewed statutory
interpretations from two agencies: the EPA and the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB").10 8 They chose the EPA and NLRB because
102. See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L.
REV. 1457, 1462 (2003) ('This model reflects the theory of judicial decisionmaking commonly
taught in law school: judicial decisions are the product of impartial, reasoned analysis grounded
in accepted sources of authority."); Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom
Philosophy?An EmpiricalInvestigationof Legal Interpretation,65 MD. L. REV. 841, 847-48 (2006).
103. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002); Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 102, at 847-48.
104. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); VIRGINIA A.
HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT:
INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING (2006); Ryan C. Black & Christina L.
Boyd, US Supreme Court Agenda Setting and the Role of Litigant Status, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
286 (2012); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of JudicialReasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1377, 1388-89 (1998)
(listing prior studies that have supported or not supported the attitudinal model); Sunstein et al.,
supra note 10, at 318-25 (finding support for the attitudinal model in nine legal subject matters,
including discrimination, campaign finance, and environmental regulation).
105. See Staudt, supra note 61, at 669.
106. Cross & Tiller, supranote 8, at 2168.
107. Id. at 2171.
108. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 825. Miles and Sunstein also considered all
Chevron decisions of the Supreme Court from 1989 to 2005. See id. They found that conservative
Justices were 30% more likely to uphold conservative agency interpretations than liberal
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they were "two important agencies known for producing politically
contentious decisions." 109 They found that the "validation rates [for
agency interpretations] of the judges of each party ris[e] when the
110
content of the agency decision is closer to their political preference."
Orin Kerr likewise found evidence of the attitudinal model in his
study of all published courts of appeals decisions that applied the
Chevron framework from 1995 through 1996.111 He found "a tendency
for Republican and Democratic judges to reach results consistent with
their political ideologies in certain areas." 112 More specifically, he found
that Republican and Democratic appointees treated some claims
differently: entitlement claims (with Republican appointees upholding
agency denials 100% of the time and the latter upholding denials only
40% of the time); immigration claims (with Republican appointees
siding with the government 71% of the time compared to 42% for
claims (with
appointees); and economic-regulation
Democratic
Democratic appointees upholding agency regulation 92% of the time
113
compared to 68% for Republican appointees).
It may be that circuit judges' behavior depends not only on their
own preferences but also on the composition of the panel and collegial
effects. As Jonathan Kastellec notes, "[C]ollegial politics can play a
large role in shaping judicial decision making-in many cases, a judge's
vote depends not just on where she stands, but with whom she sits."114
115
Recent empirical studies have found strong evidence to support this.
When it comes to Chevron deference, it seems likely that the
partisan composition of the judicial panel should affect the operation of

interpretations and that liberal Justices were 27% more likely to uphold liberal agency
interpretations than conservative ones. See id. at 826. In other words, they concluded that "the
Chevron framework is not having the disciplining effect that it is supposed to have." Id. Because
our focus is on the courts of appeals and not the Supreme Court, we do not discuss their Supreme
Court findings in detail here.
109. Id. at 848.
110. Id. at 851. Jason Czarnezki reported similar results after he considered courts of appeals
decisions that cited Chevron and concerned environmental law between 2003 and 2005. See Jason
J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation,
and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 784-85 (2008). He
confirmed "that judges vote in their perceived ideological direction." Id. at 770.
111. Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4-5, 18-19 (1998).
112. Id. at 39.
113. Id. at 39-40.
114. Jonathan P. Kastellec, Hierarchicaland Collegial Politics on the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
73 J. POL. 345, 349 (2011).
115. See, e.g., SUSAN B. HAIRE & LAURA P. MOYER, DIVERSITY MATTERS: JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2015); Kastellec, supra note 114; Sunstein et al., supra
note 10; see also Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal
Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCl. 389 (2010).
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preference-based voting, with all-Democratic and all-Republican panels
demonstrating more political behavior than mixed partisan panels.
Sunstein, Schkade, Ellman, and Sawicki argue that this phenomenon
is the product of group polarization or, in other words, the idea that
"[dieliberating groups of like-minded people tend to go to extremes."1 1 6
By contrast, a panelist with opposing political preferences can serve as
a "whistleblower," threatening to "expose the majority's manipulation
or disregard of the applicable legal doctrine." 117 This threat may prevent
the extreme attitudinal behavior that would otherwise be present with
a homogeneous panel.
Cross and Tiller found that the presence of a "whistleblower" on
the panel-that is, a judge who does not share the majority's presumed
policy preference-did indeed affect judicial behavior. In their study,
unified panels deferred to an "agency only 33% .

.

. of the time when the

policy outcomes that would have resulted from adhering to doctrine
appeared inconsistent with the panel's political preferences."1 18 Split
panels, in contrast, deferred to an agency in similar circumstances 62%
of the time. Accordingly, it was "almost twice as likely that [mixed
panels would follow doctrine] when doctrine works against the partisan
policy preferences of the court majority" than when the panels were.
unified. 119 Their whistleblower results, however, were only marginally
significant (at the p=O.10 level). 1 20
The Miles and Sunstein Chevron study found similar evidence of
the moderating effects of mixed partisan panels. According to the Miles
and Sunstein results, circuit judges who sit on unified partisan panels
(i.e., panels with either three Republican or three Democratic
appointees) voted to uphold agency interpretations that matched the
judge's presumed policy preferences 32% to 40% more often than agency
interpretations that did not match. 12 1 But when the panels were not
unified along partisan lines, the circuit judges' political behavior
moderated significantly. 122

116. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES
POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 71 (2006).

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Cross & Tiller, supra note 8, at 2156.
Id. at 2172.
Id.
See id.
Miles & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 861-62.
Id. at 863-65.
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III. OVERVIEW OF OUR EMPIRICAL STUDY

Based on these prior studies concerning Chevron in the federal
courts of appeals, we would expect two key findings in our more
comprehensive inquiry. First, we would expect, consistent with the
attitudinal model, that judges' decisions will align in a statistically
significant way with their presumed policy preferences. Second, we
would expect "whistleblower" effects that dampen the effect of
ideological majorities on mixed panels from voting consistently with
their policy preferences.
A. Study Design, Methodology, and Dataset
To analyze our research questions of interest, we utilize Barnett
and Walker's recently collected data.1 23 This dataset contains federal
circuit court decisions from 2003 to 2013 that review agency statutory
interpretations. The data include all published opinions from three25
judge panels that cite and discuss Chevron1 24 and/or Skidmorel and
proceed with judicial review of an agency's statutory interpretation. 126
The cleaned dataset includes 1,613 observations of judicially reviewed
statutory interpretations within 1,381 unique opinions (meaning that a
single judicial decision may contain more than one agency
interpretation subject to judicial review). 127 Each interpretation was
coded for nearly forty variables.1 28 Many of those variables closely
123. Barnett & Walker, supra note 12.
124. To find decisions related to Chevron deference, Barnett and Walker searched Westlaw
Next's federal appellate cases database for "Chevron" along with relevant terms such as "agency,"
"order," "ALJ," "rule," and "formal adjudication." Barnett & Walker, supra note 12, at 22 & n.141.
The authors then excluded extraneous decisions like those that were unpublished, not issued in
the federal circuit courts, or did not ultimately involve a court's review of an agency's
interpretation of a statute. Id. at 22-24, 24 n. 148. For a complete description of their study design
and methods, see Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts: The
Codebook Appendix, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2017) [hereinafter Barnett & Walker, Codebook
Appendix]. For a discussion of methodological limitations and actions taken to mitigate those
limitations, see Barnett & Walker, supranote 12, at 25-27.
125. Barnett and Walker followed similar searching and culling procedures to find additional
relevant circuit court decisions that cited Skidmore but did not cite Chevron. Barnett & Walker,
supra note 12, at 26.
126 The Barnett and Walker data-collection design leaves open the unavoidable possibility
that additional relevant published circuit court opinions exist that cite neither Chevron nor
Skidmore. See id.
127. In the empirical analyses below, we exclude 38 cases that were decided en banc. These
decisions provide a very distinct, noncomparable judicial decisionmaking environment relative to
traditional three-judge panel circuit court cases. See, e.g., Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger,
Christopher Zorn & Todd C. Peppers, The Etiology of the Occurrenceof En Banc Review in the U.S.
Court ofAppeals, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 449 (2007) (finding that the granting of rehearing en banc is
important but also rare and varied across circuits).
128. See Barnett & Walker, Codebook Appendix, supra note 124, at 7.
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tracked the variables in the leading study by William Eskridge and
Lauren Baer of how the Supreme Court applies the Chevron doctrine
and otherwise reviews agency statutory interpretation. 1 2 9
As most germane here, our analysis frequently requires that we
subset the data to allow for separate focus on cases in which the agency
interpreted the relevant statute in a liberal direction (Liberal Agency
Interpretation)and cases in which the agency interpreted the statute in
a conservative direction (Conservative Agency Interpretation).1 30
Specifically, -largely tracking Eskridge and Baer's methodology for
coding the ideological valence of interpretations, we coded agency
interpretations as conservative when they favor interests of parties like
employers, alleged discriminators in civil rights cases, tax collectors,
criminal prosecutors, and companies accused of environmental
pollution. Alternatively, if the agency favored the interests of parties
like civil rights plaintiffs, debtors, employees, immigrants, and
taxpayers, we coded the agency interpretation as liberal. In the
statistical analyses focused on divided Liberal Agency Interpretation
and ConservativeAgency Interpretation,we exclude the 126 cases where
the agency interpretations are neutral or ideologically mixed. The
resulting data with clear liberal or conservative agency interpretations
includes 1,449 observations within 1,252 unique opinions.
1. Dependent Variables
With these data in hand, we can turn to an assessment of what
explains variation in our outcomes of interest-i.e., our dependent
variables. 131 We focus primarily on three dependent variables in our
statistical and descriptive analyses: Circuit-Agency Agreement,
Unambiguous Statute, and Legal FactorReliance.
Circuit-Agency Agreement captures whether the reviewing
circuit court rules in favor of the agency's statutory interpretation. It is
coded as 1 if the circuit court favors the interpretation and 0 if it rules
against the agency's interpretation.

129. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment ofAgency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008).
130. Id. at 1205-06. Their Appendix provides full details on the coding of this variable. Unlike
Eskridge and Baer, we added trade decisions that favored domestic industry to liberal
interpretations. Likewise, we added to conservative interpretations trade decisions that favored
foreign industry and instances in which companies accused of polluting the environment or
violating business-regulating laws prevailed. Barnett & Walker, supra note 12, at 24 n. 150.
131

See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL

RESEARCH 35-37 (2014) (defining variables); Christina L. Boyd, In Defense of Empirical Legal
Studies, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 363, 365-71 (2015) (reviewing best practices in empirical legal studies
scholarship).
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Unambiguous Statute focuses on the Chevron framework's step
one and assesses whether the reviewing circuit court holds that
Congress's intent on the statute's interpretation is unambiguous. If it
holds that the statute is unambiguous, then the court enforces
Congress's clear meaning without regard to the agency's preferences. If,
however, the court finds ambiguity in the statute, it then moves to the
more deferential step two of the Chevron inquiry to ascertain whether
the agency's interpretation is a reasonable resolution of the statutory
ambiguity. Unambiguous Statute is coded as 1 if the court finds the
statute's intent unambiguous and 0 if the court finds statutory
ambiguity. Unambiguous Statute excludes all observations where the
reviewing circuit court does not engage the Chevron framework in its
decision.
Legal Factor Reliance captures the legal and factual factors
courts use to rationalize their decision in support of or opposition to the
agency's statutory interpretation. We examine a variety of these
discussed factors such as longevity of the agency's interpretation,
jurisdiction and regulatory authority, and foreign affairs. The full list
of individual factors is detailed in Tables 2 and 3, infra. For each
individual factor, we code it as 1 if the court relies on or discusses the
factor in its decision and 0 otherwise.
2. Independent Variables
We test our above-discussed theories via three key independent
variables and the effects that they may have on the dependent
variables. These independent variables are Panel Ideology, Partisan
Unified Panel, and, in select analyses, Chevron Deference.
Panel Ideology permits the assessment of whether circuit court
panels behave in ideologically motivated ways. We measure Panel
Ideology with the widely used Judicial Common Space ("JCS") ideology
scores. 132 JCS scores have a theoretical range from -1 (most liberal) to
+1 (most conservative) and are assigned to judges based on the strong
norms of senatorial courtesy in the appointment process. 133 Panel

132. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial
Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007) (comprehensively developing a JCS score for all
federal judges since 1953); see also Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers,
Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and PartisanSelection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623,
629-32 (2001) (describing the mechanics of the JCS score).
133. JCS scores are derived from the Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE Common Space ideal
points for judges' home-state senators and the appointing president. See generally KEITH T. POOLE
& HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING

(1997); Keith T. Poole, Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 954
(1998).
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Ideology is computed as the average JCS score of all circuit court judges
sitting in the majority in a case. Within our data, Panel Ideology ranges
from -0.502 to +0.538.
Partisan Unified Panel captures the potential effects of a
whistleblower (when assessed in combination with Panel Ideology and
whether the agency's statutory interpretation was liberal or
conservative). This variable measures whether the panel's partisanship
is unified (either all Republican-appointed judges or all Democratappointed judges) or divided (panels with two partisan allies and one
outsider). 134 Partisan Unified Panel is coded dichotomously as 1 when
the panel's partisanship is unified and 0 if it is divided. Within the data,
approximately 26% of the panels are composed of unified partisan
judges.
Chevron Deference captures whether the reviewing circuit court
panel utilized the Chevron deference framework in its review or,
instead, avoided applying Chevron's framework and applied a lower
level of deference to the agency's interpretation such as the Skidmoredeference framework or no deference at all. Chevron Deference is coded
dichotomously, with the variable equaling 1 when Chevron deference is
used and 0 otherwise. 135 In addition to our primary theory-linked
independent variables, we include additional control variables related
to the cases and agencies that may affect the occurrence of the outcomes
of interest. Depending on the analysis conducted, these control
variables may include:
Independent Agency assesses whether the interpreting agency
was an executive branch agency or independent. Independent Agency is
coded as 1 if the agency is independent and 0 if it is an executive
agency. 136
Agency's Interpretive Format captures the agency's format or
process for engaging in statutory interpretation by using three separate

134. An alternative way to measure potential whistleblowing effects is with Panel Variance.
Calculated as the absolute distance between the most liberal and conservative judges on a panel,
Panel Variance is measured using the panelists' JCS scores. The variable ranges from 0 to 1.052
in the data. Observations with a 0 score indicate that all judges on the panel have identical JCS
scores. In the statistical modeling presented below, alternating Panel Variance for Partisan
Unified Panel has no statistical or substantive effect on the results presented.
135. Throughout, when we say that the panel or judge used or applied Chevron deference, we
mean that the panel or judge used the Chevron two-step framework. Likewise, if we say that a
panel or judge used or applied Skidmore deference, we mean the multifactor framework. In neither
case do we mean, without more, that the panel or judge agreed with the agency.
136. The coding for this variable mirrors that used in Barnett and Walker, supra note 12, at
56 n.248. Specifically, relying on the Administrative Conference of the United States' Sourcebook
of the United States Executive Officers, they categorized agencies as independent if the head of the
agency could be removed only for cause or if the agency was traditionally categorized as an
independent regulatory commission. See id.
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dichotomous variables: Rulemaking, Adjudication, and Informal
Interpretation.An agency's format is coded as Rulemaking if the agency
uses formal "on the record" rulemaking, informal "notice-and-comment"
rulemaking, or Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
rulemaking proceedings to conduct its statutory interpretation. An
agency's format is coded as using Adjudication if its statutory
interpretations arise from adversarial hearings or adjudications.
Finally, an agency's format is coded as using Informal Interpretationif
it uses settings such as settlements, licensing or permit decisions, or
agency manual or policy statements to interpret statutes that do not fit
within our Rulemaking or Adjudication variables.
Agency Subject Matter controls, with individual dichotomous
variables, for the dominating subject areas within the data. These
subject areas include Immigration (29%), Environment (14%),
Entitlement Programs (9%), and Employment (6%). Subject areas not
within these categories are captured in a baseline "Other" subject
matter variable. We generally expect more judicial deference to
agencies when the subject matter under consideration has low political
salience or involves scientific or technical expertise.
Longstanding Interpretation captures instances where the
reviewing circuit court notes the presence of a longstanding and stable
agency position on statutory interpretation. This variable is coded
dichotomously, with its value at 1 when the court explicitly mentions
this longstanding agency position and 0 otherwise, including when the
court is silent. Of note, this control variable is present in our statistical
modeling only when the court is using Chevron deference and we are
assessing whether the reviewing circuit panel finds a statute to be
unambiguous or ambiguous. We expect that for statutes with a
longstanding agency interpretation, the statute is likely ambiguous and
leaves room (now and historically) for the agency to provide its own
interpretation.
Year, following Cross and Tiller, is coded as a continuous count
variable, starting at 0 for the first year within our data and proceeding
to 10 by 2013, the final year in our data. 137 As in Cross and Tiller's
study, this variable "is intended to capture the possibility that the
Chevron doctrine has grown weaker" or stronger over time. 138
Circuit controls for the circuit court deciding the case by
including a series of dichotomous variables-one for each circuit courtwithin the statistical modeling. A circuit court's variable is coded as 1

137. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 8, at 2170.
138. Id.
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if the case was heard within that circuit and 0 if the case was not heard
in that circuit.
B. 10,000-Foot View of Chevron in the Circuit Courts
Descriptive analysis of the Barnett and Walker data provides
important insights into administrative law, statutory interpretation,
and judicial review in the federal circuit courts. 139 To this end, Figure 1
plots key information about the direction of agency statutory
interpretations and how those interpretations are then treated by
reviewing circuit courts. As the figure's first vertical gray box reveals,
about 29.5% (n=464) of the statutory interpretations in the data were
made in a liberal direction. Another 62.5% (n=985) of the statutory
interpretations were in the conservative direction. The final 8% of the
statutory interpretations in the data were in a neutral ideological
direction or contained mixed interpretations (partially liberal, partially
conservative).
Via the vertical black lines, Figure 1 also shows how these
liberal, conservative, and neutral/mixed interpretations were treated
by the reviewing circuit court. Unlike the wide variation in the direction
of the agency's interpretation of the statutes, there is a high degree of
consistency in the overall response of circuit courts to the agency
interpretations. For liberal statutory interpretations, the reviewing
courts favor 73.9% of them. For the conservative interpretations,
reviewing circuit courts favor about 69% of them. And for the
neutral/mixed interpretations, the circuit courts favor approximately
74.5% of them.

139. The descriptive analysis of the data that we provide here follows that provided in Barnett
and Walker, supra note 12. However, the statistics reported here include the full dataset, including
the cases that cite Skidmore but not Chevron. By comparison, the vast majority of the statistics
reported in Barnett and Walker exclude the Skidmore-only cases.
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FIGURE 1: IDEOLOGICAL NATURE OF AGENCY INTERPRETATION,
COMPARED TO AGENCY-WIN RATES IN CIRCUIT COURTS
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Figure 2 reports descriptive information on the frequency that
circuit courts invoke Chevron deference in their review of agency
statutory interpretations. Chevron deference is utilized in about 72.5%
of the statutory interpretation judicial reviews in the dataset. That
means that the circuit courts rely on less deferential standards (or no
deference at all) in about 27.5% of the observations in the data. As the
vertical black line in Figure 2 indicates, in cases with Chevron
77% of
the circuit courts favor approximately
deference,
interpretations. By contrast, that number falls below 55% for circuit
court cases reviewing statutory interpretations with a non-Chevron
deference standard.

2018]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW'S POLITICAL DYNAMICS

1493

FIGURE 2: AGENCY-WIN RATES IN CIRCUIT COURTS BASED ON
DEFERENCE DOCTRINE APPLIED AND CHEVRON STEPS
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Figure 2 reports one additional descriptive detail on cases with
Chevron deference. Specifically, it highlights the percent of circuit
decisions that favor the agency's interpretation based on whether the
analysis stops at Chevron step one or, instead, step two. For
observations stopping at step one (i.e., those where the court has
determined the statute is unambiguous), the courts defer to the agency
just under 39% of the time (visible with the black square in Figure 2).
By contrast, for interpretations in which the court proceeds to step two,
the reviewing courts defer to the agency's interpretation nearly 94% of
the time (as represented by the black circle in Figure 2).
IV. THE POLITICS OF CHEVRON AND JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR

To explore the political dynamics of Chevron deference and judicial
behavior, we break our findings into three separate inquiries. First, we
explore the effects of panel ideology on agency-win rates. Second, we
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detail the factors the panels expressly relied on to rationalize their
decisions, including Chevron's theoretical foundations of congressional
delegation, agency expertise, and agency deliberative process discussed
in Section I.B. Third, we briefly summarize the effects of panel ideology
on the panel's decision whether to apply the Chevron deference
framework at all. 140
A. The Effects of Panel Ideology on Agency- Win Rates
In assessing our first research question-which factors predict
whether the circuit court panel agrees with the agency's statutory
interpretation-we focus primarily on two potential explanations:
Panel Ideology and Chevron Deference. To estimate the effects that
these variables have on the dependent variable, Circuit-Agency
Agreement, we utilize a logistic regression model with robust standard
errors clustered on the case citation. 141 Because of the ideological nature
of the inquiries in this area, we separately assess Circuit-Agency
Agreement for cases where there was a LiberalAgency Interpretationor
a Conservative Agency Interpretation.
The attitudinal theory would anticipate that as Panel Ideology gets
more liberal, the circuit panel would be more likely to agree with an
agency's liberal interpretation and disagree with an agency's
conservative interpretation. Likewise, when the Panel Ideology gets
more conservative, the circuit panel would be more likely to agree with
an agency's conservative interpretation and disagree with the agency's
liberal interpretation.
But, as detailed above, Chevron was designed to increase deference
to agency statutory interpretations and rein in the ideological
tendencies in the judicial review of agency statutory interpretations. As
such, if the legal model holds true we should expect that the use of
Chevron Deference (as opposed to a less deferential standard of review
such as Skidmore or de novo) would lead to a much higher rate of
agreement with an agency's statutory interpretation across all cases.
Similarly, many would anticipate that Chevron Deference will lead to
less ideological behavior among judges than less deferential standards.
140. These findings are explored in much greater detail in Barnett, Boyd & Walker, supra note
15.
141. Clustering by case citation accounts for the lack of independence present from two or
more reviewed instances of statutory interpretation within a single circuit panel's opinion-citation.
Failure to account for this will result in standard errors that will be inaccurate. By clustering, our
models yield robust standard errors (Huber-White standard errors) that account for the violation
of independence. See J. ScoTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL
DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA 86 (2d ed. 2006).

2018]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW'S POLITICAL DYNAMICS

1495

In other words, the expectation is that the effect of Panel Ideology is
conditional on the use of Chevron Deference. Statistically testing this
potential conditional effect of Chevron Deference in curbing the political
behavior of judges in their decision on Circuit-Agency Agreement
requires an interaction between Chevron Deference and Panel Ideology.
Table 1 reports the results of our logistic regression of the effects of
Panel Ideology, Chevron Deference, the interaction of Panel Ideology
and Chevron Deference, and additional control variables on CircuitAgency Agreement. Positive values in the reported coefficients indicate
that a variable increases the likelihood of Circuit-Agency Agreement,
and negative values in those coefficients indicate that a variable
increases the likelihood of disagreement with the agency's statutory
interpretation (i.e., decreases the likelihood of Circuit-Agency
Agreement).
The modeling provides strong evidence for our expectation
concerning Panel Ideology, Chevron Deference, and the interaction of
the two. First, Panel Ideology is positive and significant in the
ConservativeAgency Interpretationdata and negative and significant in
the Liberal Agency Interpretation data. This indicates that overall in
the data, conservative panels are more likely to agree with conservative
statutory interpretations and less likely to agree with liberal ones, and
liberal panels are less likely to agree with conservative statutory,
interpretations and more likely to agree with liberal ones. Chevron
Deference also has a notable unconditional effect on the likelihood of
agreeing with the agency's interpretation. In both models in Table 1,
Chevron Deference has a statistically significant and positive effect on
Circuit-Agency Agreement.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1496

[Vol. 71:5:1463

TABLE 1: LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF IDEOLOGY AND DEFERENCE
EFFECTS ON CIRCUIT-AGENCY AGREEMENT

Liberal Agency
Interpretation

Panel Ideology
Chevron Deference

-2.816*
(1.01)
1.478*

Conservative
Agency
n
ne
Interpretation

1.490*
(0.63)
0.953*

Panel Ideology X Chevron

(0.33)
1.291

(0.19)
-0.506

Deference

(1.14)

(0.73)

Partisan Unified Panel

0.272
(0.33)

-0.058
(0.18)

Independent Agency

-0.393

Rulemaking

(0.34)
-1.076*
(0.39)

(0.38)
-0.541*
(0.23)

Informal Interpretation

-0.428

-0.412

Subject Matter:
Environment
Subject Matter:
Employment

(0.36)
0.230
(0.35)
-0.669**
(0.39)

(0.28)
-0.073
(0.26)
0.977**
(0.52)

Subject Matter:

-0.535

-0.324

Immigration
Subject Matter:
Entitlements
Year

(0.73)
1.278
(0.89)
0.007
(0.03)

0.26)
0.312
(0.30)
0.001
(0.02)

Circuit Controls
Constant

Included
1.066*

(0.51)

0.692**

Included
0.124

(0.38

985
464
Observations
Logistic regression estimates for whether the reviewing panel decides in
favor of the agency's statutory interpretation. Baseline values include
Adjudication (for agency format) and Other (for subject matter). Standard
errors (reported in parentheses) are robust and clustered on the individual
case. ** p<0.10, * p<0.05.

The interactive effect between Panel Ideology and Chevron
Deference is also strong and behaves as expected, indicating that while
there is a lingering ideological effect in judicial behavior even when
Chevron Deference is used, the size and power of that ideological effect
is very dependent on the deference regime used by the judges.
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Interactive effects like these are difficult and misleading to interpret
using a regression table. 142 Accordingly, Figures 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8
provide graphical visualizations of the effects present from this
interaction for the Liberal Agency Interpretationdata and Conservative
Agency Interpretation data, respectively. Each figure presents the
probability that a reviewing circuit court will agree with the agency's
interpretation (the y-axis within each figure) across the full range of
Panel Ideology values (the x-axis within each figure, moving from most
liberal to most conservative), with 95% confidence around the plotted
mean probability and other variables held at their mean and modal
values. For both the liberal and conservative agency interpretation
data, the figures are presented based on the two values of Chevron
Deference: one for the instances where the court uses Chevron deference
and another where the court uses a less deferential standard of review.
And for both liberal and conservative agency interpretations, we also
provide separate plots (Figures 5 and 8) estimating the difference
between the probability of Circuit-Agency Agreement between when
Chevron Deference is and is not used, with the 95% confidence interval
plotted around that difference. 143

142. Statistical and substantive effects stemming from interacted variables in a logistic
regression model can only be fully and properly assessed through postestimation simulations. See
J. ScOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES 34-

84 (1997). Additionally, an interaction effect "cannot be evaluated simply by looking at the sign,
magnitude, or statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction term when the model is
nonlinear." Chunrong Ai & Edward C. Norton, Interaction Terms in Logit and ProbitModels, 80
ECON. LETTERS 123, 129 (2003).

143. Because overlapping confidence intervals for mean point predictions (e.g., by comparing
the confidence intervals in Figure 3 and Figure 4) do not indicate that there is no statistically
significant difference between two quantities, we estimate and plot the difference in the
probability, with its own mean and confidence interval in Figures 3 and 5. See, e.g., Peter C. Austin
& Janet E. Hux, A Brief Note on OverlappingConfidence Intervals, 36 J. VASCULAR SURGERY 194
(2002).
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FIGURE 3: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF CIRCUIT-PANEL
AGREEMENT WITH AGENCY'S LIBERAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
WHEN CHEVRON-DEFERENCE FRAMEWORK APPLIES
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FIGURE 4: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF CIRCUIT-PANEL
AGREEMENT WITH AGENCY'S LIBERAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
WHEN CHEVRON-DEFERENCE FRAMEWORK DOES NOT APPLY
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FIGURE 5: DIFFERENCE IN THE PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF
CIRCUIT-PANEL AGREEMENT WITH AGENCY'S LIBERAL STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION BETWEEN WHEN CHEVRON-DEFERENCE
FRAMEWORK APPLIES AND WHEN IT DOES NOT APPLY
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We focus first on Figures 3 and 4, where the plots depict the
predicted probabilities that circuit courts will agree with the agency's
interpretation when that agency has a liberal interpretation of the
statute. 144 When non-Chevron deference is being used, Figure 4
indicates that the most liberal panels agree with the agency's statutory
interpretation about 81% of the time, and the most conservative panels
agree with the agency's statutory interpretation as little as 18% of the
time. When panels use Chevron deference (Figure 3), the most liberal
panels agree with the agency's statutory interpretation about 91% of
the time, and the most conservative panels agree with the agency's
statutory interpretation about 66% of the time. As Figure 5 further
indicates, the difference in the probability of agreement with an
agency's liberal statutory interpretation based on whether Chevron
deference is used is statistically significant (i.e., its confidence intervals
do not intersect with 0) across nearly the full range of PanelIdeology. 145
At the extreme, with a very conservative reviewing panel, there is as

144. In these and all other estimated predicted probabilities within the Article, we set other
variable values at their means and modes, as appropriate.
145. The plotted difference is statistically significant when its 95% confidence intervals do not
intersect with 0. in Figure 5, that includes all cases decided by panels with ideology scores to the
right of -0.28 (i.e., nonextreme liberal).
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much as a 46% difference between agreement rates for when the panel
uses Chevron deference or a less deferential standard.
Figures 6 and 7 provide similar predicted effects for conservative
agency interpretations. Here, we see that when non-Chevron deference
is being used (Figure 7), the most conservative panels agree with the
agency's interpretation as little as 60% of the time, and the most liberal
panels agree with the agency's statutory interpretation about 24% of
the time. However, when panels use Chevron deference (Figure 6), the
most conservative panels agree with the agency's interpretation about
74% of the time, and the most liberal panels agree with the agency's
statutory interpretation about 51% of the time. As revealed in Figure 8,
the differences in agreement probabilities between Chevron and nonChevron deference are statistically significant (i.e., different from 0)
across nearly the entire political spectrum of judges, with only the most
conservative panels (with ideologies more conservative than +0.45)
behaving indistinguishably under Chevron and non-Chevron deference.
FIGURE 6: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF CIRCUIT-PANEL
AGREEMENT WITH AGENCY'S CONSERVATIVE STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION WHEN CHEVRON-DEFERENCE FRAMEWORK APPLIES
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FIGURE 7: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF CIRCUIT-PANEL
AGREEMENT WITH AGENCY'S CONSERVATIVE STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION WHEN CHEVRON-DEFERENCE FRAMEWORK DOES
NOT APPLY
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FIGURE 8: DIFFERENCE IN THE PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF
CIRCUIT-PANEL AGREEMENT WITH AGENCY'S CONSERVATIVE
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION BETWEEN WHEN CHEVRON-DEFERENCE
FRAMEWORK APPLIES AND WHEN IT DOES NOT APPLY
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Overall, then, these. statistical results provide two important
insights. First, Chevron deference markedly curbs ideological behavior
among reviewing circuit judges. We observe much more agreement
statutory
agencies'
with
judges
Chevron-applying
among
interpretations than we do with less deferential regimes like Skidmore
or de novo review. This ideology curbing is particularly apparent in the
face of judicial preferences that are not consistent with the agency's
interpretation.
Second, less political behavior under Chevron deference does not
mean a complete absence. Judges applying Chevron deference are still
much less likely to agree with an agency statutory interpretation that
does not align with their political preferences than an agency
interpretation that is politically aligned with the judges' preferences.
This is true for both liberal and conservative agency interpretations and
liberal and conservative judges. Liberal judges are much less likely to
adopt a conservative agency interpretation than conservative judges
are, and conservative judges are much less likely to adopt a liberal
agency interpretation than liberal judges are. Overall for liberal agency
interpretations, you still see as much as a 25% difference in the
likelihood of the court agreeing with the agency across the ideological
spectrum when that court applies Chevron deference. That difference is
as high as 63% when the court applies a less deferential standard than
Chevron. And for conservative agency interpretations, there is as much
as a 23% difference in the likelihood of agreeing with the agency across
the ideological spectrum when applying Chevron deference. That
difference is as high as 36% when the reviewing court applies a less
deferential standard of review.
Regarding the control variables in the models, Rulemaking
consistently has a negative and significant effect, indicating that circuit
panels are less likely to agree with agency interpretations emerging
from the rulemaking process than adjudications (the model's baseline).
Also significant across both models in Table 1 is Subject Matter:
Employment. It is negative for the liberal interpretations (panels are,
on average, less likely to adopt these interpretations than those in other
subject areas) and positive for the conservative interpretations (panels
are, on average, more likely to adopt these interpretations than those
in other subject areas). The variable Partisan Unified Panel assesses
the potential for whistleblowing effects. This variable is not significant
in either model, a result that we return to in much greater detail below.
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B. FactorsRelied on to Rationalize Decisions
In addition to the results indicating strong ideological and
deference-standard effects in the likelihood of a circuit court agreeing
with an agency's interpretation, we might also see differences emerge
in how conservative and liberal panels or Chevron and non-Chevron
deference panels rationalize their decisions. To examine descriptively
whether this is the case, we detail the frequency and percentage of time
that panels discuss different expressed factors in their opinions in Table
2 and Table 3. The tables' descriptive statistics are divided by Chevron
Deference, whether the reviewing circuit court agrees or disagrees with
the agency's statutory interpretation (with white cells indicating cases
where the panel agrees with the agency's interpretation and gray cells
indicating the opposite), and Panel Ideology. For ease of description, we
divide Panel Ideology into three categories: Liberal, Moderate, and
Conservative. Liberal panels are those with Panel Ideology scores
ranging from -0.502 to -0.1009. Moderate panels have Panel Ideology
scores from -0.1 to +0.1. And conservative panels' Panel Ideology scores
range from +0.1009 to +0.538. The tables' reported percentages are
calculated for each category (agency interpretation direction + panel
ideology + deference standard).

TABLE 2: CHEVRON-DEFERENCE DECISIONS
Factors Relied on or
Discussed in Decision
Longstanding and fairly
stable agency position on
the statutory

Liberal
Panel
40.56%
(n=73)
21.43%

Moderate
Panel
39.72%
(n=114)
20.45%

Conservative
Panel
38.46%
(n=160)
17.39%

interpretation1 46

(n= 12)

(fi=18)

(n=20)

Evolving agency position
on the statutory
interpretation

15.56%
(n=28)
26.79%
(n=15)

13.59%
(n=39)
37.50%
(n=33)

13.46%
(n=56)
13.04%

(n=15)

146. We coded the continuity of the agency interpretation as follows: (1) longstanding and
fairly stable, (2) evolving (meaning that the agency had a prior inconsistent interpretation), or
(3) recent (meaning that the agency had a new interpretation without having had a prior one).
Continuity that is not evident from the opinion, along with missingness, are excluded from Tables
2 and 3 but can be assessed by adding within individual columns per category (e.g., for the category
where there is a liberal panel and the panel agrees with the agency's interpretations, the
remaining percentage is 32%). In coding continuity, Barnett and Walker did not look outside of
the decision. Instead, they evaluated, among other things, whether the court referred to the
continuity, the date of the regulation, and any agency precedent on point. See Barnett & Walker,
Codebook Appendix, supra note 124, at 7.
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16.59%
18.47%
11.67%
n69)
(n=53)
(n=21)
18.26%
18.18%
19.64%
(n=21)
(n=16)
(n=11)
5.29%
7.67%
6.67%
delegation
Congressional
1 47
(n=22)
(n=22)
(n=12)
questioned
6.96%
7.95%
5.36%
(n=8)
(n= 7)
(n=3)
20.91%
15.68%
18.89%
Agency expertise (or lack
(n=87)
(n=45)
(n=34)
thereof) 148
2.61%
4.55%
3.57%
n=3
n=4)
n-2
22.36%
23.34%
31.67%
(or
Rulemaking authority
(n=93)
(n=67)
(n=57)
lack thereof) 149
4.35%
6.82%
8.93%
(n=5)
(n=6)
(n=5)
21.39%
22.65%
27.22%
(or
Agency procedures
(n=89)
(n=65)
(n=49)
lack thereof)15 0
5.22%
6.82%
10.71%
(n=6)
(n=6)
(n=6)
the panel
where
for
cases
statistics
descriptive
White shaded cells provide
agrees with the agency's interpretation. Gray shaded cells provide
descriptive statistics for cases where the panel disagrees with the agency's
interpretation. Individual cell values represent the number (n=) and
percentage of observations that meet the listed criteria (panel ideology,
factor present, Chevron-deference employed, panel agrees or disagrees
with agency's interpretation). Values are computed within the factor
category. 151
Recent agency position on
the statutory
interpretation

Tables 2 and 3 reveal some interesting variance in factors relied on
among panels based on outcome (agreeing or disagreeing with the
agency's interpretation). For example, within court decisions that favor

147. We marked as "1" those interpretations in which the parties or the court questioned if

Congress had delegated authority to the agency to interpret the statute at issue. See id. at 8. This
&

variable addresses whether so-called Chevron "step zero" is at issue, i.e., whether the predicate for
Chevron deference-the delegation of interpretive authority to the agency-exists. See Merrill
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, supra note 68, at 836 (discussing Chevron "step zero").
148. We marked "1" for interpretations in which the court justified upholding or rejecting the
agency's interpretation because of the agency's expertise or lack thereof. See Barnett & Walker,
Codebook Appendix, supra note 124, at 12.
149. We inserted "1" for interpretations in which the court justified upholding or rejecting the
agency's interpretation because of the agency's rulemaking authority or lack thereof. See id.
150. We inserted "1" for interpretations in which the court justified upholding or rejecting the
agency's interpretation based on the kind of agency procedures that the agency used (or did not
use) in promulgating its interpretation (such as formal rulemaking, notice-and-comment

rulemaking, formal adjudication, etc.). See id. at 13.
151 To aid clarity, here is an example of how the percentages are computed: For "Rulemaking
Authority (or lack thereof)," 31.67% of liberal panels that agree with the agency and apply Chevron
deference discuss rulemaking authority. That means that 68.33% of liberal panels in that same
situation do not discuss rulemaking authority.
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the agency's interpretation, around 40% of the opinions indicate
(expressly or by inference152) that the agency's position on the statutory
interpretation is longstanding and stable. 153 By contrast, that number
falls to around 20% of opinions for court decisions that oppose the
agency's interpretation. Not surprisingly, panels that disagree with the
agency's interpretation are much more likely to concern recent or
evolving agency interpretations. Additionally, court decisions favoring
the agency's interpretation are more likely to discuss agency expertise
and rulemaking authority than those decisions disagreeing with the
agency's interpretation. Notably, many of these numbers are quite
stable within the type of outcome-i.e., among liberal, moderate, and
conservative panels and whether they use Chevron deference.
Tables 2 and 3 show very little variation in relied-on factors based
on the panel's ideology and the adopted deference. Based on whether
the panel is using Chevron deference, we do see some significant jumps
in how frequently the panel discusses congressional delegation (Table 3
only), agency expertise (Table 2 and Table 3), rulemaking authority
(Table 2 only), and agency procedures (Table 2 and Table 3). Across
panel average ideologies, conservative panels that are not using
Chevron deference are more likely to question congressional delegation
in their opinions (Table 3) than panels of other ideologies. And within
opinions that ultimately disagree with the agency's interpretation,
conservative panels using Chevron less frequently rejected evolving
agency interpretations than liberal or moderate panels using Chevron
(13% vs. 27% and 38% of opinions, respectively).

152. Barnett and Walker coded the agency's interpretive continuity based on the court's
express statements, the date of the interpretation, or other evidence within the opinion itself. The
explicit or implicit reference to continuity could arise anywhere in the opinion, not necessarily in
the court's discussion of the agency's interpretation. See id. at 7. The other factors mentioned
here-such as agency expertise, congressional delegation, agency procedures, etc.-were coded
only if the courts referred to them explicitly as part of their rationale for permitting or rejecting
the agency's interpretation. See id. at 12-13.
153. It is important to note that the differences in factor reliance that we observe among panels
may not be caused by the distinct behavior of different ideology panels but may, instead, be driven
by differences in the underlying cases (which are not fully randomly assigned and are not randomly
distributed across the circuits). See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the
Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 48-50
(2015) (identifying implications of nonrandom assignment for empirical studies).
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TABLE 3: NON-CHEVRON-DEFERENCEDECISIONS
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
Panel
Panel
Panel
37.11%
43.21%
37.29%
(n=36)
(n=35)
(n=22)
22.50%
22.81%
20.34%
(n=18)
(n=13)
(n=12)
5.15%
3.70%
1.69%
Evolving agency position on
(n=5)
(n=3)
(n=1)
the statutory interpretation
17.50%
15.79%
8.47%
(n14
n9
(n=5)
10.31%
11.11%
11.86%
Recent agency position on
(n10
(n=9)
(n=7)
the statutory interpretation
13.75%
15.79%
30.51%
(n11
(n=9)
(n=18)
13.40%
7.41%
6.78%
Congressional delegation
(n13
(n=6)
(n=4)
questioned
16.25%
12.28%
18.64%
(n=13)
(n=7)
(n=11)
30.93%
28.40%
22.03%
Agency expertise (or lack
(n-30)
(n=23)
(n=13)
thereof)
28.75%
14.04%
25.42%
(n=23)
(n=8)
(n=15)
11.34%
11.11%
3.39%
Rulemaking authority (or
(n11)
(n=9)
(n=2)
lack thereof)
10.00%
14.04%
10.17%
(n=8)
n=8
(n=6)
39.18%
34.57%
28.81%
Agency procedures (or lack
(n38)
(n=28)
(n=17)
thereof)
48.75%
40.35%
38.98%
(n=39)
(n=23)
(n=23)
White shaded cells provide descriptive statistics for cases where the panel
agrees with the agency's interpretation. Gray shaded cells provide
descriptive statistics for cases where the panel disagrees with the agency's
interpretation. Individual cell values represent the number (n=) and
percentage of observations that meet the listed criteria (panel ideology,
factor present, Chevron-deference employed, panel agrees or disagrees
with agency's interpretation). Values are computed within the factor
category.
Factors Relied On or
Discussed in Decision
Longstanding and fairly
stable agency position on
the statutory interpretation

C. The Politics of Selecting the Chevron Framework
With the above empirical evidence in hand, we see that Chevron
deference appears to significantly constrain judges' political behavior in
their judicial review of statutory interpretations. This result leads to
the inevitable threshold question of whether circuit panels, being aware
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of Chevron's intent to constrain judges, choose to invoke Chevron at
politically convenient times.
The effects of panel ideology on a panel's decision to apply the
Chevron deference framework is the research question that we have
tackled in recent empirical work. 15 4 Using the same Barnett and Walker
data from 2003 to 2013, we expected to find political behavior in circuit
panels' decisions regarding which deference standard to use. In
particular, we expected judges who were politically aligned with the
agency's decision to be more likely to use Chevron to afford agencies
more interpretive discretion. We anticipated that judges who were not
politically aligned with the agency's interpretation would want broader
judicial interpretive discretion. As such, we predicted that those panels
that were not ideologically aligned with the agency's decision would be
less likely to invoke Chevron deference in their judicial review and more
likely to invoke a less deferential standard.
In regression analysis of whether the reviewing panel invokes
Chevron deference, our empirical results were telling. When an agency's
interpretation of the statute was liberal, panel ideology had no
statistically meaningful effect on whether the panel invoked Chevron
deference. However, the results did indicate an ideological effect in
cases in which the agency had a conservative statutory interpretation.
There, as expected, liberal circuit court panels were much less likely
than conservative panels to invoke Chevron-with as much as a 16%
difference in the probability of invoking Chevron across the full range
of panel ideologies. That is, liberal panels are purposefully opting to
avoid Chevron when it is politically advantageous to do so. This
indicates that the substantive effects stemming from Figure 7 are even
more potent than already discussed. These threshold political results,
viewed together with our above-discussed results regarding the
likelihood of circuit courts agreeing with an agency's interpretation
based on whether they use Chevron deference, paint an interesting,
comprehensive picture about the effects of political preferences on the
judicial review of agency statutory interpretations.
V. POLITICAL DYNAmICS AND INDIVIDUAL JUDGE BEHAVIOR

While we focus primarily on the political dynamics present within
circuit panel decisionmaking, we also evaluate more closely the
behavior of individual circuit court judges. Specifically, in this Part we
focus on individual judges' deference to conservative and liberal agency

154. See Barnett, Boyd & Walker, supra note 15.
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interpretations. To do this, we recenter the Barnett and Walker circuit
court data to focus on the way individual judges vote rather than on
cases. With the judge-level data, we can better examine the degree of
deference variation that exists within notable liberal and conservative
circuit judges. Based on our panel-level results involving Panel
Ideology, it may be that liberal judges, relatively consistently, are more
likely than conservative judges to agree with liberal agency statutory
interpretations (and vice versa). However, it could also be that some
liberal and conservative circuit judges behave in extremely political
ways, while others are consistent in the deference that they afford
agency interpretations.
Our discussion and descriptive analysis in this arena focuses on a
judge's Conservative Differential. Computed for each commonly
occurring judge in the data, the Conservative Differential measures the
difference between the percentage of cases in which a judge adopts a
conservative agency interpretation and the percentage of cases in which
the judge adopts a liberal agency interpretation. As such, Conservative
Differentials range from -100 to +100 and are positive when the judge
votes in favor of more conservative interpretations than liberal ones and
negative when the judge votes in favor of more liberal interpretations
than conservative ones.
Figures 9 and 10 highlight the Conservative Differential for key
judges within the data. The data contains at least 20 observations for
the highlighted judges, meaning that the emerging patterns are less
likely to be based on outlier cases.1 55 The overall pattern visible in the
figures is what we would expect from a political story. There are many
more liberal judges with negative Conservative Differentials than
conservative judges and many more conservative judges with positive
Conservative Differentialsthan liberal judges. However, there is also a
substantial amount of variation in what that differential is. And some
judges stand out for their very moderate behavior or for their behavior
that is contrary to their presumed ideological preferences.

155. However, given the highly collegial nature of circuit court decisions and the relatively
small number of individual judge votes per judge in the data, it is important not to read too much
into these judge-by-judge descriptive statistics.
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FIGURE 9: CONSERVATIVE DIFFERENTIALS FOR LIBERAL JUDGES
(WITH AT LEAST 20 OBSERVATIONS IN DATASET)
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Focusing first on Figure 9 and the commonly occurring liberal
judges in the data, the figure reveals a large number of judges who
behave in strongly political ways. Most notable is Judge Stephen
Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit. With a conservative differential
of -78.26, he voted to adopt 100% of the liberal interpretations that he
reviewed but only 2 1.74% of the conservative ones. Some liberal judges
in the data stand out for their very negative conservative differential
scores. This group of judges includes, for example, Justice (then-Judge)

Sonia Sotomayor, with a score of -51.85. Like Judge Reinhardt, Justice
Sotomayor, while on the Second Circuit, deferred to 100% of the liberal
interpretations that she reviewed. About a third of the 30 commonly
occurring liberal judges had conservative differential scores very close
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to 0. Also of note with the liberal judges in the data is that it is quite
rare to see a positive conservative differential score. This means that
these judges tend to behave liberally or neutrally in their judicial
reviews of statutory interpretations, but they do not, on average,
behave conservatively.
Turning to Figure 10 and the frequently appearing conservative
judges in the data, one immediately noticeable item is that the
conservative judges appear to behave less politically than the liberal
judges. In other words, fewer of the conservative judges have extreme
positive conservative differential scores than liberal judges had
negative ones. The most extreme conservative-behaving judge in the
data is Judge Jane Roth from the Third Circuit, with a conservative
differential score of +55.56. Judge Roth adopted 88.89% of the
conservative statutory interpretations that she reviewed but only
33.33% of the liberal ones. As with the liberal judges, some conservative
judges have conservative differentials at or very close to 0. We also see
a nontrivial number of negative conservative differential scores,
including 10 conservative judges with quite liberal scores ranging
between -15 and -37. This group of judges includes, for example, Judge
Peter Hall from the Second Circuit, who voted to adopt 100% of liberal
interpretations but just 63% of the conservative ones.
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FIGURE 10: CONSERVATIVE DIFFERENTIALS FOR CONSERVATIVE JUDGES
(WITH AT LEAST 20 OBSERVATIONS IN DATASET)
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VI. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR AT CHEVRON STEPS ONE AND Two
In this Part, we move to a more in-depth inquiry into judicial
behavior exclusively in cases where the panel applies Chevron
deference. Using the original case-centered Barnett and Walker data
once again, we focus on two related questions: First, how does panel
ideology explain whether a panel's Chevron analysis stops at step one
(with a finding that the statute is unambiguous) or continues to step
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two? Second, how does panel ideology affect whether the panel agrees
with the agency interpretation for cases ending in Chevron step one and
Chevron step two?
A. Panel Ideology and Statute Ambiguity
First, we examine the ideological effects on whether the Chevronapplying panel finds the statute to be ambiguous or unambiguous in its
Chevron step-one inquiry. The more or less frequently the courts find
ambiguity, the more or less frequently they give agencies interpretive
space. Based on past studies finding some political effects on judicial
behavior even within Chevron's framework, we would expect that courts
are more likely to reject agency statutory interpretations that are
inconsistent with a panel's ideological preferences at step one. By doing
so, they limit the agency's interpretive discretion. Likewise, we would
expect panels to move to step two more frequently when reviewing
agency interpretations that are consistent with the panel's preferences
because step two gives the agency more interpretive space.
As noted above, our dependent variable for this analysis is
Unambiguous Statute, with values of 1 present when the court finds the
statute to be unambiguous and values of 0 for cases where the statute
is found to be ambiguous. In cases where the panel finds the statute
unambiguous, the Chevron analysis concludes at step one.
To assess ideological effects on this finding of whether a statute is
unambiguous, we once again divide the data into conservative and
liberal agency interpretations. The results of our logistic regression
analysis (again, with robust standard errors clustered on case citation)
of the effects of Panel Ideology on the panel's finding of the statute to be
unambiguous or ambiguous are listed in Table 4's columns two and
three ("Liberal Agency Interpretation Cases" and "Conservative Agency
Interpretation Cases").
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TABLE 4: LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF IDEOLOGY EFFECTS ON
WHETHER STATUTE IS FOUND UNAMBIGUOUS

Conservative
Liberal Agency
Interpretation
CIni
Cases

Panel Ideology
Partisan
Unified Panel
Longstanding
Interpretation
Independent
Agency
Rulemaking
Informal
Interpretation
Subject Matter:

Environment

1.105**
(0.63)
-0.056
(0.32)
-0.775*
(0.33)
0.042
(0.34)
0.468
(0.37)
0.175
(0.43)
0.434

(0.35)

Agencatiae
Agny.
Interpretation
Cases

-0.648**
(0.38)
0.162
(0.19)
-0.396*
(0.18)
-0.784*
(0.39)
-0.133
(0.25)
0.043
(0.35)
0.271

(0.27)

All Cases

-0.103
(0.31)
0.172
(0.15)
-0.525*
(0.15)
-0.406**
(0.21)
0.103
(0.19)
0.167
(0.24)
0.311

(0.20)

Subject Matter:

1.304*

-0.840

0.187

Employment
Subject Matter:
Immigration
Subject Matter:
Entitlements
Year

(0.48)
-0.523
(1.16)
-0.819
(0.80)
0.071**
(0.04)
-1.815*
(0.43)
336

(0.56)
0.097
(0.28)
-0.257
(0.31)
-0.011
(0.03)
-0.468
(0.32)
708

(0.31)
0.392**
(0.21)
-0.321
(0.26)
0.017
(0.02)
-0.955*
(0.23)
1142

Constant
Observations

Logistic regression estimates of Chevron deference observations for
whether the reviewing panel decides that the statute is unambiguous (and
thus stops its analysis at Chevron step one). Baseline values include
Adjudication (for agency format) and Other (for subject matter). Standard
errors (reported in parentheses) are robust and clustered on the individual
case. ** p<0.10, * p<0.05.

As Table 4's results indicate, Panel Ideology appears to have the
expected ideological effects on whether a Chevron deference case
concludes at step one or step two. In particular, when the agency has
made a liberal statutory interpretation, conservative panels are more
likely to find the statute to be unambiguous. And when the agency has

[Vol. 71:5:1463

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1514

made a conservative statutory interpretation, liberal panels are more
likely to find the statute to be unambiguous.
To provide more substantive insight into these effects, Figures 11
and 12 plot the predicted probability that a panel will find the statute
to be unambiguous given the direction of the agency's statutory
interpretation (liberal or conservative) and the changing value of the
panel's ideology (from most liberal to most conservative).
FIGURE 11: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF PANEL FINDING STATUTE
UNAMBIGUOUS BASED ON PANEL IDEOLOGY WHEN LIBERAL AGENCY
INTERPRETATION
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As the figures indicate, for liberal agency interpretations,
conservative ideology panels have as much as a 40% chance of finding
the statute unambiguous. For the most liberal ideology panels in the
data (Figure 11), that number is just 19%. Accordingly, liberal panels
more often than conservative panels provide agencies interpretive
space to issue liberal interpretations. And for conservative agency
interpretations (Figure 12), liberal ideology panels have as much as a
41% chance of finding the statute unambiguous. For the most
conservative ideology panels in the data, that number falls to 27%.
Thus, conservative panels more often than liberal panels give agencies
space to propound conservative interpretations. While these ideological
results are relatively modest in size, especially relative to the very
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notable non-Chevron results from Table 1 and Figures 3 through 8, they
do still point to a change of up to 21% in the probability of finding a
statute to be unambiguous based on the panel's ideological composition.
FIGURE 12: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF PANEL FINDING STATUTE
UNAMBIGUOUS BASED ON PANEL IDEOLOGY WHEN CONSERVATIVE
AGENCY INTERPRETATION
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Regarding control variables in the models, the most consistent effect
comes from the Longstanding Interpretationvariable. Recall that our
expectation for this variable is that for times where a longstanding
agency interpretation is present, the reviewing panel should be more
likely to find the statute to be ambiguous and thus allow the inquiry to
move to assessing the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation in
step two. The Longstanding Interpretation variable is consistently
negative and significant, providing evidence to support our expectation.
An alternative theory involving Chevron's step one and judicial
ideology is that in all cases regardless of the valence of the agency's
interpretations or the panel's agreement with the agency, conservative
judges will be more likely to stop their Chevron analysis at step one
than liberal judges because they will more often find statutory meaning
clear. Indeed, this was how Justice Antonin Scalia, a longtime defender
of Chevron's framework, understood the Chevron framework to work.
He argued that as a textualist-who, accordingly, would more often find
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statutory meaning clear from statutory text and context-he was less
likely to find ambiguity and thus less likely to give agencies interpretive
discretion. 156 In contrast, judges who moved beyond a textual inquiry
would be more likely to find ambiguity and thus give agencies
interpretive discretion. 15 7 Recently, Judge Raymond Kethledge of the
Sixth Circuit (a Republican appointee) echoed Justice Scalia's
conception of a powerful, textual Chevron step one that will often-or,
Congress's clear
so far for Judge Kethledge, always 158-uncover
59 Textualism or strict construction is often ascribed to
meaning.1
conservative judges, while legislative history and purposivism are more
often deemed tools of liberal judges. 16 0
To assess Justice Scalia's alternative theory, we again use the
Unambiguous Statute as our dependent variable. This time, however,
we estimate the effects of Panel Ideology (and other variables) on this
dependent variable for all of the cases in our data at once-i.e.,
conservative, liberal, and neutral/mixed agency interpretations. If
Scalia's theory holds, the result should be a positive sign and
statistically significant effect on the PanelIdeology variable.
As the "All Cases" column of Table 4 indicates, there is no statistical
evidence to support Scalia's theory. Panel Ideology performs in the
wrong direction (indicating a tendency among conservative panels to be
less likely to find statutes to be unambiguous than liberal judges) and
does not have a statistically significant effect on whether the panel finds
the statute to be unambiguous. As such, there is much more evidence
to support the more standard ideological story here-that panels are
more likely to find statutes to be unambiguous when the agency's

156. See Scalia, supra note 20, at 521. Justice Scalia referred to himself as "(for want of a
better word) a 'strict constructionist' " in his 1989 essay. Id. In his later monograph, he eschewed
the label "strict constructionist," which he referred to as "a degraded form of [his preferred]
textualism." ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997).

157. See SCALIA, supra note 156.
158. Kethledge, supra note 21, at 320:
In my own opinions as a judge, I have never yet had occasion to find a statute
ambiguous. In my view, statutory ambiguities are less like dandelions on an unmowed
lawn than they are like manufacturing defects in a modern automobile: they happen,
but they are pretty rare, given the number of parts involved.
159. See id. ("For, in my experience at least, if one works hard enough, all the other
interpretations are eventually revealed as imposters.").
160. See Killebrew, supra note 19, at 1898 (citing James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons
of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5, 6 (2005))
(noting that "empirical evidence also suggests that, aside from the fact that textualist judges are
generally conservative, the use of textualist methods is disproportionately associated with
conservative outcomes in certain cases"); Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A
Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 815 (2008) (noting and
questioning the conventional thinking of which judges use textual and intentionalist tools).
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interpretation of that statute is in ideological opposition to the panel. 161
Doing so likely serves to rein in agency discretion and how deferential
the panel must be to the agency's position.
B. Panel Ideology, Chevron's Steps, and Agency Wins
While the analyses in Table 1 and Figures 3 through 8 reveal that
there is a modest ideological effect in judicial behavior in Chevron
deference cases (and a substantial ideological effect in non-Chevron
cases), it does not fully speak to whether the Chevron case effects are
present across both steps within Chevron analyses. To provide more indepth insight into this area, Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics
for the percentage of cases that panels agree with liberal and
conservative agency interpretations based on panel ideology and
whether the case ends at step one or step two in the Chevron analysis.
The relatively small number of observations within each Chevron step
makes descriptive, rather than regression analysis, preferable. 162 We
focus this descriptive analysis on the top 10% most conservative and
liberal panels in the data. If ideological patterns do not emerge for these
extreme cases, there is no reason to expect them with more moderate
panels.
Two notable conclusions emerge from Table 5. First, in general and
across panel ideologies, there is much less agreement with the agency's
interpretation for cases resolved in step one than in step two. To put it
another way, liberal and conservative panels are both much less likely
to agree with the agency's interpretation when they have determined
that the statute is unambiguous than when determining it is
ambiguous.

161. One potential explanation, which we cannot test with our dataset, is that there are two
competing right-of-center views on judicial review of government actions. See Christopher J.
Walker, The Federalist Society's Chevron Deference Dilemma, L. & LIBERTY (Apr. 3, 2018),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2018/04/03/the-federalist-societys-chevron-deference-dilemmal
[https://perma.cc/M8XT-R3K4] ("For years, if not decades, the proper role of federal courts has thus
been subject to an ongoing and vigorous debate within the Federalist Society and related
[conservative] circles.").
162. See, e.g., LONG, supra note 142, at 53-54 (discussing appropriate sample sizes for
maximum likelihood regressions).
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TABLE 5: PANEL AGREEMENT WITH AGENCY'S INTERPRETATION
Percent of time that
panel agrees with
Liberal Agency
Interpretation

Percent of time that
panel agrees with
Conservative Agency
Interpretation

Extreme Liberal
Panels
Extreme

50.00%
(N=2)
28.57%

37.93%
(N=29)

Conservative
Panels
Case Ends at Step
Two:
Extreme Liberal

(N=14)

(N=24)

Case Ends at Step
One:

37.50%

90.48%

78.05%

Panels

(N=2 1)

(N=41)

Extreme
Conservative
Panels

96.55%
(N=29)

95.74%
(N=47)

Second, the Table's statistics show some modest ideologically tinged
behavior for outcomes in steps one and two. For case outcomes for cases
ending at Chevron's step one, liberal panels are about 12% less likely to
agree with the agency's interpretation when it is conservative than
when it is liberal. Conservative panels are about 9% less likely to agree
with the agency's interpretation when it is liberal than when it is
conservative. While the small observation size in step one has a limiting
effect in our interpretation ability, the data that we have are telling.
For case outcomes for cases ending at Chevron's step two, liberal panels
are, as they were under step one, about 12% less likely to agree with
the agency's interpretation when it is conservative than when it is
liberal. There is not, however, any notable difference among
conservative panels in this context.
Overall, then, the size of these ideological differences in steps one
and two is generally not large, especially considering that this analysis
focuses exclusively on the most extreme liberal and conservative panels
in the data. This is consistent with our larger story about Chevron
decisions from our primary empirical model: there are some ideological
effects, but they are not the only or even primary story when it comes
to judicial review in these cases.
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VII.WHISTLEBLOWER AND PANEL EFFECTS

To test the whistleblower theory-that is, that panels that are not
homogeneous in their partisan composition will behave less politically
due to a partisan whistleblower's pressure on the panel-we first return
to Table 1's logistic regression results. There, the whistleblower theory
would expect that PartisanUnified Panels would be less likely to agree
with an agency's interpretation than those with a whistleblower on
them. However, as Table 1 reveals, the PartisanUnified Panel variable
is not statistically significant for either the liberal or the conservative
agency interpretation models.
Cross and Tiller's more nuanced whistleblower theory expects that
whistleblower effects should only be apparent when there is a lack of
ideological congruence between the panel and the agency's
interpretation. 1 6 3 In these cases of conflict in preferences between the
panel and the agency, the presence of a whistleblower on the panel is
likely to produce a higher adherence to doctrine by the panel.
Because of the expectation that the effect of PartisanUnified Panel
on the likelihood of panel agreement with the agency is conditioned on
the panel's ideology, an empirical test of this ideological whistleblower
theory requires the interaction of Panel Ideology and PartisanUnified
Panel for both liberal and conservative agency interpretations. 164 Table
6 reports the logistic regression results that include this interaction
term. The dependent variable continues to be Circuit-Agency
Agreement.

163. Cross & Tiller, supra note 8, at 2171-73.
164. In their assessment of policy-minded whistleblowing, Cross and Tiller examine the
interplay of unified/divided panel (measured like our PartisanUnified Panel variable) with policy
convergence (indicating whether the assumed preferences of the panel majority, based on party
affiliation, aligns with the policy output of the agency). See Cross & Tiller, supra note 8, at 2173.
Our methodology is very similar to that used by Cross and Tiller but, because of the use of Panel
Ideology instead of party affiliation, it permits a more nuanced assessment of whether a panel
should be expected to favor the agency outcome.
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TABLE 6: LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF WHISTLEBLOWER EFFECTS ON
CIRCUIT-AGENCY AGREEMENT

Liberal Agency
Interpretation

Panel Ideology

-2.968*

Conservative
Agency
Interpretation

2.117*

(1.11)

(0.75)

1.302
(1.13)
0.224

-0.417
(0.72)
-0.017

(0.41)
1.473*
(0.33)
0.286

(0.18)
0.947*
(0.19)
-1.066

Unified Panel

(1.31)

(0.72)

Independent Agency

-0.384
(0.34)

0.711**
(0.38)

Rulemaking

-1.074*
(0.39)

-0.537*
(0.22)

Informal Interpretation

-0.430

-0.412

Subject Matter:
Environment
Subject Matter:
Employment
Subject Matter:
Immigration
Subject Matter:
Entitlements
Year

(0.36)
0.235
(0.35)
-0.670**
(0.39)
-0.530
(0.74)
1.287
(0.88)
0.007
(0.03)

(0.27)
-0.088
(0.26)
0.978**
(0.52)
-0.327
(0.26)
0.313
(0.30)
-0.002
(0.02)

Circuit Controls
Constant

Included
1.067*

Included
0.110

(0.51)

(0.39)

Panel Ideology X Chevron
Deference
Partisan Unified Panel
Chevron Deference
Panel Ideology X Partisan

985
464
Observations
Logistic regression estimates for whether the reviewing panel decides in
favor of the agency's statutory interpretation. Baseline values include
Adjudication (for agency format) and Other (for subject matter). Standard
errors (reported in parentheses) are robust and clustered on the individual
case. ** p<0.10, * p<0.05.

Because of the difficulty in interpreting interactive effects in a
regression table, we immediately turn to the substantive effects from
this regression as reported in Figures 13, 14, 15, and 16. There, we
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observe very little difference between divided and unified partisan
panels for either liberal or conservative agency interpretations. This is
true even at the ideological extremes for panels where we would most
expect a whistleblowing effect to occur (i.e., liberal panels with
conservative agency interpretations and conservative panels with
liberal agency interpretations). Indeed, the slight differences between
divided and unified panels that are present for ideologically extreme
panels are in the opposite direction than expected. As the Figures
reveal, for both conservative and liberal agency interpretations, we see
that unified panels are actually slightly less likely to be political (and
more likely to defer to the agency's interpretation) than divided panels
that have a whistleblower on them. 165
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FIGURE 13: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF PANEL AGREEMENT WITH
AGENCY'S LIBERAL INTERPRETATION BASED ON PANEL IDEOLOGY
WHEN UNIFIED PANEL
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165. Similarly, in earlier work, we found no evidence of whistleblower effects at "step zero"i.e., whether courts invoke Chevron or a less deferential standard. Barnett, Boyd & Walker, supra
note 15, at 15-17.
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FIGURE 14: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF PANEL AGREEMENT WITH
AGENCY'S LIBERAL INTERPRETATION BASED ON PANEL IDEOLOGY
WHEN DIVIDED PANEL
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FIGURE 15: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF PANEL AGREEMENT WITH
AGENCY'S CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION BASED ON PANEL
IDEOLOGY WHEN UNIFIED PANEL
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FIGURE 16: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF PANEL AGREEMENT WITH
AGENCY'S CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION BASED ON PANEL
IDEOLOGY WHEN DIVIDED PANEL
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CONCLUSION

Two decades ago in their foundational study on Chevron deference,
Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller concluded that "[p]artisanship clearly
affects how appellate courts review agency discretion," in that "panels
controlled by Republicans were more likely to defer to conservative
agency decisions (that is, to follow the Chevron doctrine) than were the
panels controlled by Democrats," and vice versa. 166 Cross and Tiller,
however, also concluded that legal doctrine nevertheless matters
because minority judges on a panel can use Chevron deference "to corral
the partisan ambitions of a court majority whose policy preferences
would best be accomplished by neglecting the dictates of doctrine." 167
Other scholars have built on this study, further supporting the finding
that more ideologically diverse panels are less likely to be influenced by
their partisan priors than more ideologically uniform panels.1 6 8
This Article casts serious doubt on those findings and related
intuitions about administrative law's political dynamics. Utilizing the
most comprehensive circuit court dataset to date, we find that, while
166. Cross & Tiller, supra note 8, at 2175.
167. Id.
168. See Barnett, Boyd & Walker, supra note 15, at 8-9 (discussing studies).
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there are some statistically significant results as to partisan influence,
Chevron deference has a powerful constraining effect on partisanship
in judicial decisionmaking. And, contrary to the Cross and Tiller study,
we find no statistically significant whistleblower or panel effects.
Why our study reaches a contrary conclusion is an open question. It
could be that since the Cross and Tiller study the circuit courts have
more fully embraced Chevron deference as a constraint on partisan
decisionmaking. The Cross and Tiller dataset spanned 1991 through
1995,169 whereas ours covers circuit court decisions from 2003 through
2013. It could also largely be the result of the differences in scope. The
Cross and Tiller study, after all, only looked at five years of decisions
by the D.C. Circuit, for a total of 115 opinions. 170 Our study, by contrast,
includes eleven years of decisions by all thirteen circuit courts, for a
total of more than 1,600 decisions.
Whatever the reasons for these differences, our findings do more
than contribute to the longstanding academic debate among political
scientists and legal scholars over the legal and attitudinal models. They
also have important implications for the real-world debate over the
future of Chevron deference. As Congress, the federal judiciary, and
legal scholars consider eliminating or narrowing Chevron deference,
they should more closely consider one significant and overlooked cost:
such reform could result in partisanship playing a larger role in judicial
review of agency statutory interpretations. It may turn out that other
factors may convince the Supreme Court (or Congress) to abandon
Chevron, 171 but Chevron's ameliorating effects on judicial partisanship
should be part of the calculus.
After all, the overall picture that emerges from our study provides
compelling evidence that the Chevron Court's express objective to
reduce partisanship in judicial decisionmaking has been quite effective.
Relatedly, Chevron's success in reducing such partisanship also
buttresses the uniformity theory for Chevron. Panels of various
ideologies are more likely to defer to agencies with Chevron'sframework
than without, thereby rendering it more likely that agency
169. Cross & Tiller, supra note 8, at 2168.
170. Id. at 2169.
171. Philip Hamburger, for instance, has a very different reading of our findings: "Rather than
reveal diminished politicization, Walker's numbers provide strong evidence of diminished judicial
independence and even of institutionalized judicial bias. That is, his research actually proves just
how much judicial bias Chevron creates in favor of the government-not how much judicial bias it
reduces." Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, Illustrated by Statistics, L. & LIBERTY (Apr. 12, 2018),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2018/04/12/chevron-deference-administrative-state-philiphamburger/ [https://perma.cc/737T-4JCM]; see also Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2016) (arguing that Chevron deference violates constitutional due process by
introducing systematic progovernment bias in judicial decisionmaking).
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interpretations will prevail (or not) across the country. Of course, our
findings do not attempt to compare how different ideological panels
treat a particular agency interpretation, and more empirical work in
this area would be helpful. But our findings do suggest that Chevron
creates a more favorable climate for nationwide uniformity that de novo
or Skidmore review cannot match.
Finally, in considering these political dynamics and theoretical
implications, one should not ignore that modest partisan effects exist
even when courts apply Chevron's framework. These partisan effects
mean that courts, and especially the Supreme Court, should create a
better-defined doctrine if they seek to have Chevron become more
successful in meeting its accountability and uniformity goals. Indeed,
the results that we present here only amplify an earlier call that two of
us made after presenting a descriptive account of our circuit-by-circuit
data and discussing the wide variability in how the circuits reviewed
agency statutory interpretations. 17 2 For instance and perhaps most
urgently, which tools of statutory construction should courts use at step
one to determine whether a statute is ambiguous? Is there an order in
which courts should use them? Which agency actions have the "force of
law"? What exactly is the domain of the major-questions exception to
Chevron deference? What is the proper role for courts in Chevron step
two? In short, the fact that Chevron deference promotes two of its goals
does not mean that it achieves them as well as it could.
Our results provide the empirical basis for courts (and Congress) to
reassess not only the viability of Chevron deference but also its
mechanics. That reassessment need not have a clear ideological
valence. For instance, conservative judges may be predisposed to the
major-questions doctrine because it helps limit what they perceive as
aggressive and usually liberal agency actions that go beyond the
agency's statutory authority. But Chevron's utility in limiting partisan
judging and promoting uniformity, for instance, may undermine the
value of the major-questions doctrine. Not only may Chevron provide
additional value for major questions (as opposed to run-of-the-mill ones)
by helping to keep partisanship in check during judicial review of
especially contentious issues, but Chevron's ability to provide
nationwide uniformity may be more important because of the questions'
significance. At the same time, conservatives have largely sought to
limit Chevron step one to a textual inquiry to promote their preferred
method of statutory interpretation. 173 A textual step one, whatever its
172. Barnett & Walker, supra note 12, at 71 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court needs to provide better
guidance to lower courts if it seeks to create a stabilizing doctrine.").
173. See Jellum, supra note 36, at 761-71.
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demerits in identifying ambiguity, may allow for less judicial discretion
at step one by permitting the use of only one interpretive device and
thus promote uniform interpretation.
Our goal here, however, is not to take a position on these disputes.
Other considerations (including perhaps Chevron's conflicting
theoretical underpinnings, such as expertise or delegation) can affect
the normative debates over Chevron's domain or mechanics. Instead,
we demonstrate only how our findings can affect these debates and
provide a more complete understanding of how Chevron functions.
Regardless of one's position on Chevron's future, administrative law's
political dynamics should not be ignored because they go to the heart of
Chevron's theoretical grounding.

